

**Party Polarization, Party Commitment, and Conflict Extension among
American Party Activists**

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Abstract

Recently, the Democratic and Republican parties in government and in the mass electorate have grown increasingly polarized on multiple policy dimensions. In this paper, we assess whether this process of “conflict extension” has occurred among party activists and the process by which it has occurred. We offer both a macro-level explanation of how the nature of contemporary party organizations and the motives of party activists within them create opportunities for conflict extension and a micro-level account of activist change that is consistent with conflict extension and emphasizes attitudinal conversion on policy issues and activists’ commitment to their parties. “Party-committed” activists should be likely to shift their policy stands closer to the ascendant positions within their parties, making conflict extension a more distinct possibility than if partisan change occurs through activist replacement alone. Using cross-sectional and panel surveys of national convention delegates, we find clear evidence for conflict extension among party activists and support for our explanation of it.

The growth in issue polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties dominates the discussion of contemporary American politics. *New York Times* columnist Paul Krugman (2002) argues, “Fundamental issues are at stake, and the parties are as far apart on those issues as they ever have been.” Similarly, *Washington Post* commentator George F. Will (2004) notes that, “Never [has American] politics been more European, meaning organized around ideologically homogeneous parties,” while Ronald Brownstein observes that “From Congress and the White House through the grassroots, the parties today are becoming less diverse, more ideologically homogeneous, and less inclined to pursue reasonable agreements” (2007: 11). Many political scientists echo the same theme, reporting extensive evidence of a widening policy gap between Democrats and Republicans in government (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995; Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 2001; Jacobson 2000; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003) and in the mass electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Jacobson 2005; Brewer 2005; Black and Black 2007).

Polarized parties do not make the current era unique—the major parties have been polarized on some set of policy issues throughout much of American history (e.g. Sundquist 1983; Gerring 1998). What differs is the number of issue dimensions on which they are polarized. Conventional wisdom says that party conflict is dominated by a single policy dimension. Thus, partisan change is characterized by *conflict displacement*, in which a new cross-cutting issue dimension emerges, the parties become polarized on it, and they converge on the previously dominant line of cleavage (Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1983; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Miller and Schofield 2003). Sundquist contends that “conflict displacement . . . is *the* characteristic that identifies a party realignment” (1983: 13, emphasis in original), while Schattschneider states that “all politics deals with the displacement of conflicts or efforts to resist the displacement of conflicts” (1960: 68). Miller and Schofield argue that there currently is an “inevitable party dynamic . . . increasing the polarization of the two parties along the [newer] social dimension, while decreasing the [older] economic policy differences between the two parties” (2008: 446).

In recent years, however, partisans in government and the electorate have grown increasingly polarized on multiple major policy dimensions—not just the newer “cultural” issues such as abortion and gay rights, but also the racial and civil rights issues that emerged in the 1960s as well as the economic and social welfare issues that originated with the New Deal (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Polsby and Wildavsky

2004; Brewer and Stonecash 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Republicans have become more consistently conservative on all these issue dimensions while Democrats have grown more consistently liberal. Layman and Carsey (2002a, 2002b) label this process *conflict extension* and, like other scholars who point to political activists as agents of polarization (Jacobson 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005), they identify party activists as the driving force behind it.¹

In this paper, we assess whether conflict extension has occurred among party activists and the process by which it has occurred. We offer a macro-level explanation of how the nature of contemporary party organizations and the motives of party activists within them create opportunities for conflict extension. Next, we argue that these opportunities would remain unrealized if the micro-level process of activist change was that assumed in the existing literature. We develop an account of change among individual activists that is consistent with conflict extension and emphasizes attitudinal conversion on policy issues and activists' commitment to their parties. In sum, conflict extension among party activists results in part from the overall circumstances of contemporary party politics—with policy-oriented activists operating within participatory party organizations—and in part from individual activists with high levels of party commitment bringing their policy attitudes closer to the dominant positions in their parties. We assess our argument with surveys of delegates to national party conventions from 1972 to 2004, focusing especially on a 1992-2000 panel study. We find a clear pattern of conflict extension and substantial support for our micro-level explanation of the process.

Political Parties, Party Activists, and the Macro-Level Foundations of Partisan Change

To understand change among party activists, we need to consider the nature of political parties, the motivations of activists, and the degree of influence that activists have within the parties' organizational structures. The leading view of parties in contemporary political science sees parties as groups of people focused mainly on the goal of winning political office (Downs 1957; Schlesinger 1991; Aldrich 1995). Following from an older view of parties as broad coalitions with diverse goals (e.g. Schattschneider 1942; Key 1964), a recent alternative perspective sees issue-oriented groups and activists as the dominant force in parties and their policy goals as the principal focus of party organization and development (Cohen et al. 2008a, 2008b). We begin this section by considering the first perspective and examining how the political

incentives of activists and the relative openness of the parties—particularly their nomination processes—may encourage conflict displacement or conflict extension among office-seeking parties. We then turn to the second perspective and briefly consider its implications for historical and recent partisan change. While the two views of parties may suggest different patterns of change in earlier eras, they both point strongly to the conditions necessary for conflict extension being present in the contemporary period.

Parties as Office Seekers

The office-seeking view of parties can be traced to Downs' assumption that "a political party is a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election" (1957, 25; see also Schumpeter 1942: 283). Aldrich reaffirms the centrality of office seekers, arguing that "the major political party is the creature of the politicians, the ambitious office seeker and office holder" and is created, maintained, and reshaped in order to advance their goals (1995: 4; see also Schlesinger 1975, 1991; Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2006). For Downs, there is only one such goal: winning elections to gain office. Aldrich and other contemporary scholars view the ambitions of office seekers and office holders more broadly, but electoral success remains the central objective. In terms of policy issues, this assumption implies that parties will take positions that maximize the chances of victory at the ballot box. If public opinion clusters near the ideological center, then parties should take positions that minimize policy differences between them (e.g. Downs 1957; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970).

However, scholars within this tradition also recognize that office seekers need help—in the form of money, time, labor, and expertise—to win party nominations and general elections. This help comes from who Schlesinger (1991) calls "benefit seekers" (see also Aldrich 1983a, 1995; Aldrich and McGinnis 1989; Miller and Schofield 2003, 2008): party activists whose benefits, whether material or policy rewards, depend on the party winning control of office. These activists do not represent the core of the parties or the rationale for their existence and development. However, numerous scholars contend that, because of their importance to electoral victory, activists' goals and level of influence place important constraints on the types of policy positions staked out by the parties and their candidates, limiting their ability to converge to the center of the ideological spectrum (Aronson and Ordeshook 1972; Aldrich 1983a, 1995; Chappel and Keech 1986; Masket 2007).

We argue that activists' incentives and the extent of their influence over party nominations—whether nominations are open to a wide range of participants or are closed to and controlled by party leaders or party insiders—also should help determine the nature of party conflict. When activists are driven mainly by material goals and party leaders control party nominations—conditions widely believed to have held throughout much of American history—conflict displacement is quite likely to occur. When activists are motivated more by policy considerations and nominations are open to a wide range of activists—conditions present in contemporary parties—conflict extension should become more likely.

Patronage-Seeking Activists and Party-Controlled Nominations. The scholarly consensus is that party activists in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century mainly sought material benefits: patronage, government contracts, and political contacts and prestige (Schattschneider 1942; Wilson 1962; Polsby and Wildavsky 2004). Chief among these “professional” activists were the state and local party leaders who dominated party politics through their control of patronage distribution, local and state nominations, and the selection of delegates to the parties’ national conventions. Because of the latter, party “bosses” also effectively controlled presidential nominations (Schattschneider 1942; Busch 1997).

Because activists seeking material benefits can obtain them only if the party wins elections, the candidates most likely to gain their support are those who appeal to broad swaths of the electorate (Schattschneider 1942). Thus, the policy positions taken by parties in which patronage-oriented party leaders and activists decide nominations should mainly be centrist ones, and that certainly is the conventional wisdom about the traditional American parties (Tocqueville 1966; Bryce 1910; Aldrich 1995). As the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association lamented in the waning years of such parties, “alternatives between the parties are defined so badly that it is often difficult to determine what the election has decided even in the broadest terms” (1950: 3-4).

However, even election-oriented parties may take polarized policy positions if highly divisive issues arise and “polarize the community,” as they apparently did during the major realignments of the traditional parties era (Sundquist 1983: 300). In these circumstances, vote-maximizing parties may find that polarized positions become advantageous and that “centrists are crushed” (Sundquist 1983: 324; see

also Downs 1957: 118-19). Thus, as Sundquist states, “when a society polarizes, so do the parties” (1983: 328), just as the parties of the 19th and early 20th centuries periodically did.

Once election-oriented parties stake out polarized positions on one set of issues, they are likely to avoid non-centrist stands on other, cross-cutting issue dimensions. That is certainly true of the majority party, whose office seekers and patronage-seeking bosses avoid clear positions on issues that could divide their winning electoral coalitions and threaten their hold on government (Schattschneider 1960; Riker 1982; Sundquist 1983; Carmines and Stimson 1989). The minority party has more incentive to champion cross-cutting issues (Riker 1982; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Miller and Schofield 2003), but as Carmines notes “party leaders, even if they are part of the minority, receive a variety of material and symbolic benefits” (1991: 76) and thus have a stake in maintaining the dominant issue cleavage. From this perspective, the leaders of both parties have a “powerful incentive to suppress or avoid any new crosscutting issue that threatens the party’s unity” (Sundquist 1983, 307).

Of course, once the parties have staked out distinct positions on new issues, the issues that previously shaped party conflict become cross-cutting and have the potential to disrupt the parties’ newly-formed coalitions and power bases. Thus, when the parties polarize on a new issue dimension, they should move toward the center on the older dimension. In short, when parties are composed of office-seekers and “professional” activists, the most likely form of partisan change is conflict displacement.

Issue-Oriented Activists and Participatory Nominations. In his influential variation on the office-seeking view of parties, Aldrich (1995) argues that the nature of party politics changed dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century. The alterations were numerous, but the most important for our purposes were the emergence of a “new breed” of issue-oriented party activists and the growth of their political influence, due in part to the development of a participatory presidential nomination process (e.g. Kirkpatrick 1976; Miller and Jennings 1986; Aldrich 1995). Although the office-seeking view of parties continues to see ambitious politicians and their electoral goals as the central focus of party politics, it recognizes that the increased presence and political influence of issue activists places constraints on the types of policy positions these politicians take in pursuit of electoral victory. From our perspective, these changes have served to make conflict extension a more distinct possibility.

Progressive-era reforms reduced the power of party bosses and stimulated the replacement of patronage-oriented “professional” activists with what most scholars viewed as a new type of activists. These activists, often labeled “amateurs” or “purists,” were motivated more by their convictions on policy issues than by material or electoral goals (Wilson 1962; Wildavsky 1965; Soule and Clarke 1970; Aldrich 1995). Amateurs had become influential in party politics even before the Democratic party overhauled its presidential nomination process between 1968 and 1972. However, the Democrats’ reforms, and their impact on the GOP’s nomination system, significantly enhanced that influence by creating a participatory nomination process in which candidates seek party nominations by appealing directly to primary and caucus participants (Aldrich 1980; Polsby and Wildavsky 2004). This made issue-oriented activists more important because they are disproportionately represented in primaries and caucuses, and because candidates need them to establish the campaign war chests and personal bases of support that are necessary to win nominations not directly determined by party leaders (Aldrich 1980, 1995; Busch 1997).

The growing influence of issue-oriented activists has been identified by several scholars as the chief reason for the recent growth of party polarization (Jacobson 2000; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). It also is a root cause of conflict extension because when party nominations are won by attracting support in caucuses and primaries, candidates have incentives to reach out to groups of activists motivated by multiple issue agendas.

Most contemporary presidential nomination contests that do not include an incumbent feature multiple candidates vying for the party’s nomination. Most of these candidates have very similar stands on the issues that traditionally have separated the parties. In this situation, an effective strategy may be to raise new issues that attract new constituencies into the nominating process. As Aldrich argues, contemporary nomination candidates “will not emphasize issues on which their opponents are known to have similar positions. . . . Each candidate will attempt to raise the salience of ‘his’ issue . . . the candidates will become the entrepreneurs of their special appeal” (1980, p. 174; see also Polsby and Wildavsky 2004). Thus, the participatory nomination process leads strategic office seekers to attract various groups of activists with ideologically-extreme positions on a range of issues into party politics.

The cultural issue dimension—the newest of the major domestic policy agendas—provides some good examples of such strategic behavior. In 1972, the Democratic party moved distinctly to the left on cultural issues (Layman 2001), awarding its presidential nomination to George McGovern. McGovern supported equal rights for women, favored reduced penalties for marijuana use, and opposed calls for a national ban on abortion (White 1973), and did so partly for strategic purposes. Lacking support from the party's dominant urban, labor-union wing, McGovern looked to young anti-war and New Left activists as potential supporters and needed to appeal to their liberal sensibilities on cultural issues. As political journalist Theodore White noted, McGovern “had to recruit his army and its troops from the most extreme of the peace groups and the young of the campus—and if their cultural values were not majority cultural values, nonetheless tactic demanded he pursue them” (1973: 115).

Strategic imperatives also played a role in the Republican party's move to the cultural right in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In order to wrest control from the GOP's moderate-liberal wing and secure the 1980 presidential nomination for Ronald Reagan, the economic and foreign policy conservatives in the party's “New Right” wing tried to attract culturally-conservative evangelical Christians into Republican politics. New Right strategists encouraged evangelical pastors like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson to form political organizations (Oldfield 1996), while Reagan and other GOP leaders appealed to evangelicals' conservative views on cultural issues like abortion and school prayer. The strategic element of cultural conservatism was evident in conservative operative Paul Weyrich's 1980 statement that “The New Right is looking for issues that people care about and social issues, at least for the present, fit the bill” (quoted in Reichley 1987: 79).

Once multiple groups of activists, each with non-centrist views on different issues, have been attracted into a party, strategic office seekers have incentives to take ideologically-extreme positions on all of those issues in order to appeal to them. Recent political history is replete with examples of presidential candidates (or eventual presidential candidates) moving their stands on key issues toward the ascendant positions among their parties' activists. These include Lyndon Johnson's movement toward racial liberalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the shift of George H.W. Bush from a pro-choice position on abortion during his unsuccessful bid for the GOP nomination in 1980 to a pro-life stance in

his successful campaign of 1988, and Jesse Jackson moving from a staunch pro-life abortion stance in the 1970s to a pro-choice position during his Democratic presidential campaigns in 1984 and 1988.

As these examples reveal, the consistently conservative or liberal positions of key party politicians should spur further movement toward consistent conservatism or consistent liberalism in the parties' activist bases, and this may produce even greater pressures for office-seekers to take non-centrist stands on the whole range of issues. The combination of elite- and activist-level changes should push the parties' electoral coalitions toward more ideologically-consistent positions. In short, the nature of contemporary party nominations and activism, and the incentives of strategic office-seekers within this context, creates opportunities for conflict extension in elite, activist, and mass politics.

Parties as "Policy Demanders"

In contrast to the office-seeking outlook on parties, Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller define parties as broad coalitions of "interest groups, social group leaders, activists, and other 'policy demanders' working to gain control of government on behalf of their goals" (2008b: 6). From this perspective, policy-oriented activists are more than passive constituencies to which strategic politicians must appeal in order to achieve their electoral goals. Instead, such activists are the central actors in the parties, with their policy goals providing the principal rationale for party organization. According to Cohen and his colleagues, this has been true of political parties throughout American history.

If, in fact, the political parties of the 19th and early-20th centuries were populated by policy-driven activists, then it is possible that conflict extension characterized this period as well as the current era. Different groups of issue activists may have infiltrated the parties and coalesced to pursue non-centrist viewpoints on an array of policy dimensions.² On the other hand, if the parties' leaders or dominant factions controlled nominations, as they generally did at all levels of elections until the early 1900s and mostly did at the presidential level through the 1960s (Polsby and Wildavsky 2004), then the presence of issue-oriented activists may not have been sufficient to produce conflict extension. As different groups of policy demanders competed with each other for influence within a party and control over its issue agenda, particular groups may have had sufficient numbers and resources to control a party's meetings, caucuses, and conventions. That may have allowed them to maintain the party's focus

on a particular issue agenda and to limit the influence of groups focusing on cross-cutting agendas. Thus, it is not clear whether conflict extension or conflict displacement would have defined issue change for parties populated by policy-oriented activists operating within a party-centered nomination process.

In the current period, however, the policy-seeking outlook on parties suggests the possibility of conflict extension even more strongly than the office-seeking perspective does. The reason is this perspective's contention that issue-oriented activists are integral to the parties' organizations and leadership structures. According to Cohen et al. (2008a, 2008b), recent presidential nominations have been effectively decided by coalitions of party leaders, interest group leaders, and ideological activists in the "invisible primary" period before the actual primaries and caucuses. The method that these party coalitions follow "is to reach agreement on someone whom all wings of the party can trust and to focus campaign resources and voter attention on that person" (2008a: 10).

If winning presidential nominations depends on appealing to all sets of policy demanders in a party, then the successful candidates are most likely to be those who stake out non-centrist positions on multiple policy dimensions—candidates such as Ronald Reagan in 1980, George W. Bush in 2000, and Barack Obama in 2008. Candidates, such as Democrat Paul Tsongas in 1992 or Republican Steve Forbes in 1996, with clearly liberal or conservative views on one major policy agenda, but centrist positions on other agendas, should not fare as well. Thus, strategic office-seekers should take ideologically-extreme positions on a variety of issues, creating the clear potential for conflict extension to develop.

Conflict Displacement, Conflict Extension, and the Micro-Level Foundations of Activist Change

Whether the opportunities for conflict extension that exist in the contemporary party system are actually realized should depend on the nature of change among individual party activists. The most influential theories of activist-level partisan change—the spatial models of party activism developed by Aldrich (1983a, 1983b, 1995; see also Aldrich and McGinnis 1989) and by Miller and Schofield (2003, 2008; Schofield and Miller 2007)—assume that activists are policy-oriented and operate within a highly open party system— precisely the conditions that exist in contemporary party politics and that should encourage conflict extension. However, they point to conflict displacement rather than conflict extension as the likely outcome of activist change. They do so, we argue, because of their assumptions that activists

are motivated only by policy goals and have fixed policy preferences. Those micro-level assumptions do not allow the policy attitudes of individual party activists to grow more consistently-liberal or consistently-conservative, and thus make conflict extension among activists very unlikely. However, if we relax these assumptions and allow activists to be committed not only to their policy goals, but also to their parties and to have non-fixed policy preferences, then individual activists may move to more ideologically-extreme and consistent policy positions as such positions grow more prevalent among party candidates, office holders, and fellow activists. Such party-based issue conversion should help to produce conflict extension among active Democrats and Republicans.

Policy Commitment, Fixed Policy Preferences, and Conflict Displacement

In Aldrich's (1983a, 1995) model of party activism, individuals decide to become and/or remain party activists based on the proximity of their issue preferences to the mean policy positions of current activists in each party. If such decisions occur in a policy space with two cross-cutting dimensions, a growth in the polarization of the parties' activists along one dimension is accompanied by party convergence on the other dimension (Aldrich 1983b: 87-92). Miller and Schofield (2003, 2008; Schofield and Miller 2007) agree that parties normally are polarized on only one dimension at a time. For them, partisan change is triggered by candidates strategically engaging in "flanking" moves to capture groups of potential activists who have non-centrist positions on the second dimension but not on the first. This makes party activism more attractive to individuals motivated by the second dimension and less appealing to those animated by the first dimension, eventually leading the parties to become polarized along the former and to converge on the latter. Discussing the near-term party positions on cross-cutting economic and "social" issues, Miller and Schofield argue that it is inevitable that "as social polarization increases between the parties, the economic differences will slowly disappear" (2008: 444).

The predictions of conflict displacement by Aldrich and Miller and Schofield seem to arise from two assumptions. First, they assume that activists are motivated solely by their policy preferences: they become involved in and remain involved in a party only if its policy positions and those of its candidates are relatively close to their own. The second assumption—that activists' policy preferences are fixed—follows from the first. People whose political commitments lie entirely with their policy goals and not

with the party should not change their issue positions because the stands of party candidates, platforms, or other activists are changing. As Miller and Schofield contend, “warring activists of different stripes are not generally willing to make ideological sacrifices in the interest of the parties’ candidates” (2008, 445).

Two circumstances necessarily result from activists having fixed issue positions. First, changes in the aggregate positions of the two parties’ activist bases result entirely from changes in individuals’ participation decisions—from some activists dropping out of party activity and being replaced by new activists who hold different views. Second, cross-cutting issue dimensions will remain cross-cutting over time. Thus, if there are two cross-cutting issue agendas, then increased party polarization on the newer agenda should make party involvement more attractive to non-active individuals who have extreme views on it but centrist positions on the old dimension, and less attractive to current activists who are extreme on the old dimension but centrist on the new issues, and thus reduce polarization on the older agenda. In other words, activist-level partisan change should result in conflict displacement, not conflict extension.

There are, however, scenarios under which replacement among activists with fixed policy preferences might produce at least a temporary pattern of conflict extension. For example, if parties stake out extreme views on multiple issue dimensions, activists who are cross-pressured or who hold moderate views on those dimensions might drop out and be replaced by newly mobilized individuals with consistently extreme views on both dimensions. Parties also may form coalitions of single-issue activists, and individuals with non-centrist attitudes on only one set of issues may not drop out of the party when it takes extreme stands on other issues if only the first dimension is important to them.

However, parties and their candidates are unlikely to take extreme stands on multiple issue dimensions over the long run unless the number of consistently-liberal or consistently-conservative citizens mobilized by such stands is large enough to offset losses among activists with extreme views on only one of or neither of the dimensions. Moreover, if parties are merely “marriages of convenience” among unrelated issue publics, then they could be easily fractured as some groups of activists threaten to leave the party or as the other party tries to attract dissident activists. Indeed, Miller and Schofield encourage the contemporary Democrats to do just that, saying, “The best Democratic response to the increasing power of social conservatives in the Republican Party must be to seek the support of the social

liberals who are increasingly disaffected” in the GOP (2008: 444). Accordingly, both Aldrich (1983b) and Miller and Schofield (2003) argue that activist replacement produces conflict displacement except when there is an even balance between the numbers of activists motivated by each issue dimension, the resources those activists provide to the parties, and the salience of the different dimensions.

Ideology-Based Conversion and Conflict Extension

Sustained conflict extension becomes much more likely if activists’ policy preferences are not fixed—if activists can change on policy issues, bringing their own views closer to the ideologically-extreme positions taken by party leaders and fellow activists. Such attitudinal conversion among existing activists would allow the aggregate positions of Democratic and Republican activists to grow more polarized on multiple issue dimensions. Accordingly, numerous scholars show that issue conversion among continuing party activists contributes substantially to aggregate partisan change (Miller and Jennings 1986; Stone 1991; Rapoport and Stone 1994; Herrera 1995; Carsey and Layman 1999).

It is possible that such conversion may result from activists’ ideological frameworks. Converse (1964: 224-230) famously showed that political activists and elites are much more likely than ordinary citizens to think about politics in an ideological way and to organize their policy preferences in an ideologically coherent (or constrained) manner (see also McClosky, Hoffmann, and O’Hara 1960; Herrera 1992). Thus, as new sets of policy issues arise, activists may bring their positions on them into line with their abstract ideological structures. For example, Republican activists who already possess conservative ideologies and conservative positions on social welfare issues may bring their views on newly-emerging cultural issues into line with those existing orientations. Democratic activists similarly may bring their cultural positions into compliance with their general liberalism. This would lead to increased party polarization on cultural issues while not reducing polarization on social welfare issues.

However, one problem with an ideology-based explanation for attitudinal conversion and conflict extension is that not all issues fit easily within existing ideological frameworks. For example, the guiding principle of American conservatism since the New Deal era has been a commitment to limited government and greater latitude for private and individual action in the public sphere. However, the conservative position on the cultural issues that have emerged more recently supports a stronger role for

government in promoting and protecting traditional moral and cultural values. Thus, it is not clear that Republican party activists would move toward greater conservatism on cultural issues simply because they are ideological conservatives who tend to have conservative views on other issues.

This suggests that the explanation for activists taking consistently-liberal or consistently-conservative positions across a range of policy domains may lie less in the first of Converse's "social sources of constraint"—namely ideology, or "idea-elements go[ing] together . . . for more abstract and quasi-logical reasons developed from a coherent world view" (1964: 211)—and more in the second of these sources: social diffusion, or some set of elites or activists putting positions on various issue dimensions together into "packages" that are then consumed as "wholes" by other activists and voters (Converse 1964: 211; see also Downs 1957: 96-113; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Zaller 1992). For example, some Republican activists may adopt conservative positions on both social welfare and cultural issues because either GOP candidates and leaders or some set of conservative ideological or interest group leaders combine a limited welfare role for government, low tax rates, and opposition to abortion and homosexual rights into a single conservative package that the activists then "purchase."³

Party-Based Conversion, Party Commitment, and Conflict Extension

This explanation for individual activists shifting their issue preferences toward more ideologically -extreme and consistent positions is based in party membership and party commitment rather than abstract ideology. As McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara note, many active partisans have high levels of "party spirit" and thus are "highly motivated not only to belong to a party appropriate to their beliefs, but to accept its doctrines" (1960: 421). Thus, as party leaders, candidates, and other party activists begin to take extreme stands on various issues, many individual activists may adopt more-extreme views because they are committed to the party and thus have incentives to accept its ascendant positions.

Party commitment, in fact, is widespread among political activists. Although the activists of recent decades are driven more by purposive, policy-oriented goals than were their predecessors (Wilson 1962; Wildavsky 1965; Aldrich 1995; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005), most continue to be strongly attached to their party and committed to its electoral success, and many are formally involved in the party organization (Conway and Feigert 1968; Soule and Clarke 1970; Miller and Jennings 1986). In fact, even

policy-motivated activists tend to be quite dedicated to the party (Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport 1983; McCann 1995), meaning that party commitment has not waned even while purposive incentives have swelled (Miller and Jennings 1986; Carsey et al. 2003).

Party commitment among activists is more than the psychological attachment that defines party identification in the mass electorate (Campbell et al. 1960). Certainly many, perhaps most, party activists have deeply-held subjective loyalties to their parties (McClosky, Hoffmann, and O'Hara 1960; Miller and Jennings 1986), and those are particularly strong among individuals who continue in party activism beyond a single campaign (Bowman, Ippolito, and Donaldson 1969). However, party commitment also has instrumental and social components. Many activists realize that the best, and sometimes only, way to achieve most goals—whether they are policy-oriented or professional—in American politics is through one of the two major parties. Having cast their lot with a particular party, their desired ends can only be reached if that party is successful (e.g. Stone and Abramowitz 1983). Party involvement also produces personal ties to other party activists and sometimes is triggered by such ties (e.g. McClosky, Hoffmann, and O'Hara 1960; Conway and Feigert 1968). The connections that most activists develop to other party members create social pressures to support the party irrespective of its candidates or policy positions.

Party commitment is particularly important for the possibility of conflict extension because its instrumental, social, and psychological components closely parallel some of the key factors that may encourage activists to bring their policy positions closer to those of their parties (McCann 1995; Layman and Carsey 1998). One reason why activists convert on issues is because it helps them to achieve their political goals. For some activists, having policy positions closer to the dominant ones in the party might enhance their own political or professional careers, while others may convert because they see a united front within the party as electorally beneficial (Schlesinger 1991). Similarly, political competition with the other party may give activists strategic reasons to distinguish themselves from the other party's members (McClosky, Hoffmann, and O'Hara 1960). Some activists also may convert on one set of issues in order to induce other activists who care especially about those issues to support their policy goals.

Activists may convert toward the ascendant policy positions in their parties for social or psychological reasons as well. Social and political interaction with fellow partisans who hold non-centrist

views on one or more issue dimensions may begin to color an activist's own views on that dimension and encourage them to move their attitudes in a more extreme direction (McCann 1995; Layman and Carsey 1998). As McClosky and his colleagues suggest, activists "are apt to associate with people of their own political persuasion" and thus are "subjected to strong party group efforts to induce them to conform" (1960: 421). Because party commitment is based partly in strong social connections to other party members and party-committed activists, particularly those in leadership posts, may have more interaction with other activists, they may face particularly strong social pressures to convert.

From a psychological perspective, party affiliation may serve as a conceptual filter, organizing and shaping the policy attitudes of activists, much like it does for mass party identifiers (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992). When party candidates, platforms, and numerous fellow activists take non-centrist stands on particular issues, this may send signals to individual activists that being a Republican or Democrat entails holding clearly conservative or liberal views on those issues—particularly when the other party has staked out markedly different positions. Because party-committed activists have especially strong subjective attachments to their parties, these signals should be quite strong for them.

In sum, party-committed activists should be more likely than other activists to convert toward the dominant policy positions in their parties, and such conversion is crucial to the development and continuation of conflict extension. If substantial numbers of activists are motivated by and committed to their parties, then when a party and its candidates stake out ideologically-extreme positions on multiple policy dimensions, many of its continuing activists should move their own views on one or more of the dimensions in that direction. This should mean that a greater proportion of party activists hold extreme views on multiple issue dimensions, that activists' attitudes toward the multiple issue agendas become more closely related in the aggregate, and, ultimately, that an increase in party activist polarization on one issue agenda may be accompanied by a maintenance or an increase in polarization on another agenda.

Party Asymmetries in Issue Change and the Effects of Party Commitment

Spatial models of party activists tend to predict symmetrical changes across the two parties (although Miller and Schofield's (2003) flanking maneuvers suggest that change might begin at different times for each party). However, if we allow activists to change their preferences, and particularly if that

change is due to party commitment, issue change may be asymmetrical across the parties as Republicans and Democrats adjust to the special circumstances of their leaders, candidates, and fellow activists.

During the time period we study, there are at least two reasons why the movement of Republican activists toward more consistently-conservative issue positions may have been more pronounced than the growth of consistent liberalism among Democratic activists. First, a large portion of the Democratic activist base already held liberal positions on the whole range of policy domains before the well-documented increases in party polarization in the 1980s and 1990s. As Kirkpatrick (1976) reports, the McGovern Democratic activists who propelled their candidate to victory in the party's 1972 nomination contest were highly liberal on a whole host of issues—from civil rights to anti-poverty measures to the Vietnam war and to moral and cultural matters (see also Miller and Jennings 1986; Sinclair 2006). This comports with evidence that Republican presidential candidates and members of Congress have advanced rightward more than their Democratic counterparts have moved to the left in recent years (Hacker and Pierson 2005; Sinclair 2006; Jacobson 2007). Thus, both the room for increases in ideological extremity and consistency and the cues from candidates and office holders encouraging such increases simply may have been greater for Republican activists than for active Democrats.⁴

A second reason lies in differences in political style or “culture” between the two parties. Freeman asserts that the Democratic party is “pluralistic and polycentric” (1986: 329), with activists' primary loyalties often lying with the groups or causes that they represent rather than with the party. The GOP, with its “eleventh commandment—thou shalt not criticize a fellow Republican,” is a more hierarchical party in which “activists are expected to be good soldiers who respect leadership and whose only important political commitment is to the Republican party” (Freeman 1986: 339, 346). For Democrats, group conflict among various internal constituencies is an accepted fact of party life (Freeman 1986: 329), while the “good soldiers” in the GOP are trusted to curb dissenting views and toe the party line on matters of party and public policy. Thus, commitment to the party may be stronger among Republican activists than Democratic activists, and, even more importantly, the relationship between party commitment and issue conversion should be stronger for Republicans than Democrats.⁵

Summary, Analyses, and Expectations

In sum, both macro-level and micro-level factors have made conflict extension more likely in contemporary politics. Policy-oriented activists and a participatory nomination system have created opportunities for conflict extension, and party-based issue conversion by activists should increase the likelihood that such opportunities will be realized. Party commitment should make activists more likely to move their policy views toward the ascendant positions in their parties, leading activists' attitudes on issue dimensions that once were cross-cutting to be more closely related in the aggregate and making it possible for party polarization to increase on all of those dimensions.

To assess this argument, we conduct a number of different analyses. First, we examine changes over time in the level of polarization between Democratic and Republican activists on the three major issue agendas that have dominated American domestic politics in recent decades: social welfare, racial, and cultural issues. Because levels of party commitment are relatively high within our samples of activists,⁶ we expect that party polarization should have increased in each of these issue domains. We also assess the degree to which change has been asymmetrical across the two parties—expecting that recent increases in consistent conservatism in the GOP have been more pronounced than increases in consistent liberalism among Democrats—and whether patterns of party polarization among activists have coincided with such patterns among party office holders and the parties' mass coalitions.

After showing that conflict extension, rather than conflict displacement, has occurred among party activists, our second step is to evaluate the contributions of activist replacement and issue conversion to increases in party polarization on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues. We expect conversion to have played a key role. Third, we appraise whether increases in partisan issue polarization have been accompanied by growing levels of constraint between activists' attitudes toward the three dimensions, and the degree to which conversion and replacement have contributed to increased constraint. We expect that the aggregate-level relationships between activists' social welfare, cultural, and racial attitudes have grown stronger over time, and that increases in attitudinal consistency among individual continuing activists (i.e. conversion) have contributed substantially to that. We also expect the increases in issue constraint to have been more marked among Republican activists than among active Democrats.

Fourth, we assess the degree to which issue conversion among party activists has been party-based or based in activists' ideological frameworks. We do so by examining the effect of party affiliation on conversion among continuing activists while controlling for the effects that ideology and attitudes toward other issue dimensions have on changes in issue preferences. We expect party affiliation to be related to issue conversion even while allowing for the possibility of ideological conversion.

Our fifth analysis assesses the key component of our argument by examining the effect of party commitment on issue conversion among continuing party activists. We expect that party-committed activists should be more likely than other activists to convert toward the dominant policy positions of their party, and that the effect of party commitment should be stronger in the GOP than for Democrats.

Data

To assess these hypotheses, we turn to the Convention Delegate Studies (CDS) : a series of surveys of Democratic and Republican national convention delegates and presidential campaign activists from 1972 to 2004. The CDS surveys from 1972 to 1992 were conducted by Warren E. Miller and other scholars.⁷ The 2000 CDS was conducted by the authors of this paper and was modeled after the earlier CDS surveys. It included both a cross-sectional survey of 2000 convention delegates and a panel survey of respondents to the 1992 CDS.⁸ We also conducted the 2004 CDS, which combined an online survey and a mail survey of delegates to the 2004 party conventions.⁹

The CDS provide the most appropriate data source for our inquiry for four reasons. First, as the longest-running set of surveys of American party activists, they allow us to document changes in polarization between Democratic and Republican activists over the longest time span possible. Second, the 1992-2000 panel study allows us to examine the individual-level replacement and conversion processes that underlie aggregate conflict extension among activists. Third, national convention delegates are among the most active participants in party politics. They help draft party platforms, often occupy party leadership roles, and, during the national conventions, receive more media coverage than any other group of party activists. Fourth, the CDS surveys allow us to examine a group of party activists that is a bit broader than just the delegates to a particular year's convention. Because the 1980, 1984, 1988, and 2000 CDS surveys all included panel components, they surveyed many individuals who, although

delegates to earlier conventions, were not delegates to that year's convention, but were active in its presidential campaign. Our analysis focuses on this larger set of presidential campaign activists.

Our initial analyses employ all of the CDS surveys from 1972 through 2004. However, due to the 1992-2000 panel and because there was much more consistency in the questions on policy issues in those two surveys than in earlier years, we focus primarily on the period from 1992 to 2000.¹⁰

Party Polarization in Activists' Policy Attitudes from 1972 to 2004

To gauge changes over time in the level of policy polarization between Democratic and Republican activists, we estimated structural equation models of the impact of party on activists' attitudes toward all of the social welfare, racial, and cultural issues included in the cross-sectional CDS surveys from 1972 to 2000.¹¹ Each year's analysis includes a confirmatory factor model in which social welfare, racial, and cultural issue attitudes comprise separate latent variables,¹² and we allow a dummy variable for party (coded 1 for Republicans) to affect each of those variables. The regression coefficients for the party variable indicate the difference between the Republican and Democratic means on each issue dimension.

Figure 1 shows these estimated party differences from 1972 to 2004. In 1972 the differences between Democratic and Republican activists on social welfare and racial issues were already quite large, but the parties' activists were much less polarized on cultural issues.¹³ The gap on cultural issues between Republican and Democratic activists grew rapidly and substantially between 1972 and 1988. Contrary to the conflict displacement perspective, however, party differences on the older social welfare and racial agendas showed no signs of decline. In fact, party polarization on all three issue dimensions has grown noticeably since 1988.¹⁴ Thus, we have clear evidence that conflict extension, and not conflict displacement, has characterized recent change among party activists.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

The patterns in Figure 1 leave two important questions unanswered. First, have the recent increases in party polarization on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues been driven mainly by an increase in consistent conservatism among Republican activists because, as we suggested above, consistent liberalism was already at a very high level among Democratic activists prior to the 1980s? To assess that possibility, we took each CDS respondent's mean position on all of the cultural issues, all of

the racial issues, and all of the social welfare issues used to compute the party differences in each year.¹⁵ Then, defining “liberal” positions on each dimension as all values below .5 on the zero-to-one scales and “conservative” positions as all values above .5, we computed the percentages of Democratic and Republican activists in each year with liberal positions on all three of the major domestic issue agendas, with conservative positions on all three agendas, and with some other mixture of positions (i.e. activists who are cross-pressured or have moderate positions on the three agendas).

Figure 2 displays these percentages over time and clearly confirms our expectations about the patterns for each party. Democratic activists were already quite consistently liberal in 1972 when a majority of them supported staunch liberal George McGovern for president. Nearly 63 percent of Democratic activists had liberal positions on each of the social welfare, cultural, and racial issue agendas in 1972. Consistent liberalism among active Democrats dropped sharply between 1972 and 1980 when the party re-nominated the more-moderate Democratic president, Jimmy Carter. However, it rebounded quickly in 1984 and rose even further in 2004.

In contrast, nearly 72 percent of Republican party activists in 1972 were in the cross-pressured or moderate category, while only 23 percent held conservative positions on all three policy agendas. Over the next three decades, uniformly conservative positions increased sharply (to 58 percent in 2004). Importantly, the growth of consistent conservatism in the GOP has not resulted only from the increase in cultural conservatism among Republican activists. The party’s active base has indeed grown much more conservative on cultural concerns since 1972, but it also has turned sharply rightward on social welfare.¹⁶

Figure 2 makes it clear that the main force behind partisan conflict extension in recent years has been the sharp growth in the presence of consistently conservative Republican activists. However, that is not because Democratic activists have clung to the ideological center, but because a large percentage of them already had consistently liberal stands when our time series began.

[Insert Figure 2 About Here]

The second question provoked by Figure 1 is whether conflict extension among activists is mirrored among the parties’ office-holders and mass coalitions? To assess that, Figure 3 presents the level of party polarization on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues between members of Congress,

activists, and mass party identifiers in presidential-election years—the only years in which we have data on activists—from 1972 to 2004. The activist series were taken directly from Figure 1. The mass series were taken from Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz (2006), who computed levels of party polarization with the American National Election Studies (NES) using the same method we used for activists. The congressional series are based on the roll-call votes cast on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues in the U.S. House and Senate in presidential-election years from 1972 through 2004. We computed the difference between the mean proportion of Republican and Democratic members of each chamber voting on the conservative side of all roll-call votes within a particular issue domain in a given year. We then averaged those differences in the House and the Senate for each policy domain.¹⁷

Because all of these measures are based on different questions and specific issues and all have different metrics, we have standardized all of them to have means of 50 and standard deviations of 25. That allows us to compare the trends in each series, but, of course, prevents us from comparing levels of party polarization across the three series. As a partial remedy, we examine the one issue that was included in each of the CDS surveys: abortion. To make our measures of party polarization on abortion among activists and citizens as comparable as possible to the congressional measure, we computed the percentage of each party's members taking the pro-life side on abortion and then took the difference between the pro-life percentage of Republican and Democratic activists and identifiers.¹⁸

We would not expect to find clear evidence of causality in the patterns of party polarization in Figure 3. One reason is that our data are limited to only nine time points with four years between each one.¹⁹ If issue change at one level of the party system does respond to change at another level, the response should take less than four years to develop. That means that polarization at one level driving polarization at another level may appear as simultaneous change in our presidential-election-year data.

Second, there may be reciprocal causality between issue polarization among the parties' activists, identifiers, and members of Congress. Like other scholars (Sundquist 1983; Chappell and Keech 1986; Aldrich 1995), our account of conflict extension assigns a leading role to party activists. However, we also have argued, again like other researchers (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Aldrich 1995; Miller and Schofield 2003), that changes among candidates and office-holders may spur activist change. For

example, the catalyst for activists with extreme views on a particular issue moving into a party in the first place may be strategic office-seekers staking out non-centrist positions on the issue. While mass-level conflict extension clearly should occur in response to the growth of polarization among party activists and elites (Layman and Carsey 2002a, 2002b), there may be reciprocity even here, with increasing polarization between the parties in the electorate encouraging further issue divergence among the parties' activists, candidates, or office-holders (Rohde 1991; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; Polsby 2005).

Despite these limitations for attributing causality, we draw three conclusions from Figure 3. First, party polarization on all of these issue dimensions grew noticeably between 1972 and 2004 for the parties in Congress, party activists, and the parties in the electorate. Second, the patterns of polarization for these three different components of the party system have trended together fairly closely, especially for party activists and the congressional parties. Third, the portion of the figure on abortion makes it plain that the parties in the electorate are considerably less polarized than the parties in government or party activists, just as other research has argued (e.g. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005). However, it is also evident that as the parties' activists and members of Congress have diverged on abortion, the abortion differences between Republicans and Democrats in the mass electorate have grown as well.

[Insert Figure 3 About Here]

Although a full demonstration of the causal relationship between party polarization among the parties' activists, members of Congress, and identifiers is well beyond the scope of this paper and our data, we did conduct some very basic analyses of the three series in an effort to uncover a few more clues about what is driving what. We restricted these analyses to the abortion series because our measures there are the most comparable across the three series. We estimated simple Granger Causality models (Granger 1969) as well as a general error correction model (De Boef and Keele 2008).²⁰ With so few data points, these analyses are far from definitive, but they do suggest that activists may have driven party polarization on abortion. We find that activist polarization exerts a causal impact on congressional polarization, but congressional polarization does not cause activist polarization. The analyses also show that both activist polarization and congressional polarization on abortion cause mass polarization, but that mass polarization does not have a causal effect on party polarization among activists or in Congress.²¹ In

short, conflict extension among activists clearly coincides with similar developments in congressional and mass politics, and may have played a leading role in the process.

Replacement, Conversion, and Conflict Extension Among Party Activists

Our account of activist-level conflict extension assigns a key role to attitudinal conversion among current party activists. If aggregate change among activists is due only to the replacement of old activists by new ones, then the most likely result of partisan change is conflict displacement. Sustained conflict extension becomes much more likely if individual activists move their own positions on various issue dimensions closer to the ascendant ones in their party. Thus, we turn now to assessing the contributions of issue conversion among continuing activists and of activist replacement to the growth of party polarization on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues. To do so we employ the 1992-2000 CDS panel and the cross-sectional surveys in 1992 and 2000. This requires limiting our focus to only those issues that were asked about, with identical questions and response options, in both the 1992 and 2000 surveys. There were 11 such questions, including six questions about social welfare issues, two about racial issues, and three about cultural issues (specifically, abortion).²² Table 1 presents our results.

Before we evaluate the contributions of replacement and conversion to changes in overall party polarization, we must determine what those changes were. In the first set of rows in Table 1, we show the estimated differences between the policy attitudes of Republican and Democratic activists in 1992 and 2000, computed with the same method used for Figure 1. On all three dimensions, party polarization was already large by 1992, with the gap between Democrats and Republicans ranging from .37 to .43 points on 0-to-1 scales. However, it still grew noticeably between 1992 and 2000 in all three issue domains: by .06 on our 0-to-1 scale on social welfare, .06 on abortion, and .07 on racial issues.²³

[Insert Table 1 About Here]

To assess replacement effects, we use the 1992-2000 panel and the 2000 cross-sectional survey to compare the attitudes of “drop-outs” (1992 presidential campaign activists who were not active in 2000) to those of the “newcomers” (2000 campaign activists who said that they first became active in party politics after 1992) who replaced them between 1992 and 2000. We estimate the same model used to compute the levels of party polarization among all activists for drop-outs and newcomers.²⁴ To gauge

conversion effects, we employ the 1992-2000 panel data and estimate our model for the attitudes of “stayers” (individuals who were active in both the 1992 and 2000 campaigns).²⁵

The results are shown in the second and third sets of rows in the table. Turning first to replacement effects, party differences on abortion, social welfare, and racial issues were all significantly larger for new activists in 2000 than they were for the 1992 activists whom they replaced. The difference in polarization between drop-outs and new activists is largest on racial issues, but is conspicuous on abortion and social welfare as well. Moving to conversion effects, Democrats and Republicans active in presidential campaign politics in both 1992 and 2000 were more polarized in 2000 than they had been in 1992 on every issue dimension. Thus, as we expected, both turnover among party activists and attitudinal change among continuing activists contributed to partisan conflict extension between 1992 and 2000.

At first glance, the effects of replacement appear larger than those of conversion. However, the contributions of replacement and conversion to overall change are dependent on the proportion of party activists who stay involved in and drop-out of party politics, and, in our sample, a large majority (83%) of individuals who were active in presidential politics in 1992 remained active in 2000. To assess the contributions of replacement and conversion to overall increases in party polarization, we use formulas developed by Rapoport and Stone (1994).²⁶ The last set of rows in Table 1 shows that about 70 percent of the overall level of activist polarization stems from conversion across all three issue dimensions. Thus, conflict extension might have occurred if replacement was the only process of activist change, but issue conversion has made conflict extension much more likely and larger in scope.

Replacement, Conversion, and the Growth of Attitudinal Constraint among Party Activists

Because conflict extension occurs when Republican activists adopt more consistently-conservative positions on a variety of issue agendas and Democratic activists adopt more consistently-liberal positions, the emergence of partisan conflict extension in recent years should have been accompanied by an increase in the degree to which activists’ preferences on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues are related to each other, or “constrained.” Increases in constraint at the aggregate level should result both from new activists with ideologically-consistent positions replacing old party activists with more cross-pressured views and from individual continuing activists bringing their social welfare,

racial, and cultural views more closely together. We assess these predictions in Table 2. In the first two columns, we examine overall changes in constraint by showing the correlations between latent abortion, social welfare, and racial attitudes for all activists and for Democratic and Republican activists separately in 1992 and 2000. The correlations between abortion and social welfare attitudes and between abortion and racial attitudes grew between 1992 and 2000 among all activists and among each party's activists. The correlation between social welfare and racial attitudes did not grow for all activists or for Democrats, but it already was quite large in 1992.²⁷

The results for Republican activists provide further evidence of an asymmetrical increase in issue polarization and constraint across the two parties. Not only did the correlation between social welfare and racial attitudes actually increase in the GOP, but the growth in the relationship of abortion attitudes to views on the other two issue agendas was clearly larger for Republicans than Democrats.

[Insert Table 2 About Here]

The last four columns of Table 2 show that both activist replacement and activists' converting toward more consistent policy attitudes contributed to the increase in ideological constraint. Among all activists, the correlations between abortion attitudes and both social welfare attitudes and racial attitudes were clearly stronger for new activists in 2000 (.79 and .59) than they were for the drop-outs in 1992 (.56 and .43). The relationship between social welfare and racial attitudes was no different for the two groups, but was large for both. Moving to conversion effects, individuals active in presidential campaign politics in both 1992 and 2000 displayed more ideologically-consistent policy attitudes in 2000 than in 1992. Among all continuing activists, abortion attitudes became more strongly correlated with social welfare and racial attitudes. The relationship between social welfare and racial attitudes did not grow, but, again, was already extremely strong in 1992.²⁸ We again see some asymmetry across the two parties as both the replacement and conversion effects are stronger for Republicans than for Democrats.²⁹

Partisan or Ideological Issue Conversion?

The analyses in tables 1 and 2 make it plain that individual continuing activists converting to more ideologically-extreme and consistent positions on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues has played a major role in the development of partisan conflict extension. The question now is has such

conversion actually been partisan, with activists bringing their issue preferences in line with their party ties or the ascendant positions in their party? Or, in keeping with Converse's (1964) evidence that people active in politics tend to have ideologically-constrained policy preferences, has it been mostly ideological, with activists bringing their views on particular issue dimensions into line with their ideologies and their attitudes on other issue dimensions?

To assess the effect of party on changes between 1992 and 2000 in social welfare, racial, and cultural issue preferences relative to the effects of ideology and attitudes on other issues, we use the 1992-2000 panel data and estimate the structural equation model illustrated in the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Abortion}_{it} &= \alpha_1 + \lambda_1 \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{11} \text{Social Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{12} \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{13} \text{Ideology}_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \text{Party}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{1,it} \\
 \text{Social Welf}_{it} &= \alpha_2 + \lambda_2 \text{Social Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{21} \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{22} \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{23} \text{Ideology}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{Party}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{2,it} \\
 \text{Racial}_{it} &= \alpha_3 + \lambda_3 \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{31} \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{32} \text{Social Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{33} \text{Ideology}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{Party}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{3,it} \\
 \text{Ideology}_{it} &= \alpha_4 + \lambda_4 \text{Ideology}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{41} \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{42} \text{Social Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{43} \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \text{Party}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{4,it}
 \end{aligned}$$

The λ parameters connecting ideology and each issue attitude at time t (2000) to their own previous values at time $t-1$ (1992) capture the expected individual-level stability in ideology and abortion, social welfare, and racial attitudes (all ranging from 0 for most liberal to 1 for most conservative) over time.³⁰

The β parameters linking party (a dummy variable for Republicans) at $t-1$ to issue attitudes at t capture the potential influence of party affiliation in 1992 on current ideology and current attitudes on abortion, social welfare, and racial issues. Because the model controls for past values of each endogenous variable, these parameters can be viewed as measuring the impact of party on *change* in ideology or policy attitudes from 1992 to 2000—in other words, party-based conversion. The γ parameters connecting ideology and each issue attitude at t to attitudes on the other two issue dimensions or ideology at $t-1$ capture the impact of ideology or attitudes on one issue dimension in 1992 on change in attitudes on another issue dimension or in ideology between 1992 and 2000—in other words, ideological conversion.

The estimates of this model are presented in Table 3.³¹ Not surprisingly, there is considerable stability in attitudes toward all three types of issues over our eight-year period. The unstandardized

stability coefficients (the regression coefficients found on the diagonal of the first four rows of the table) are all .38 or greater and are all highly statistically significant ($p < .0001$). We also see evidence of activists bringing their attitudes into line with their views on other issue agendas or with their ideological identifications. Activists who were more conservative on social welfare in 1992 were more likely than social welfare liberals to convert in a conservative direction on racial issues and in ideology between 1992 and 2000. The gaps in racial attitudes and ideological identification between activists with the most conservative social welfare attitudes and those with the most liberal social welfare attitudes both increased by .16 between 1992 and 2000. Racial conservatism in 1992 is associated with conservative change in individuals' ideologies and social welfare and abortion attitudes, while activists who were more pro-life on abortion in 1992 moved their ideologies and social welfare and racial attitudes in a conservative direction. Conservative ideological identification is related to increases in conservatism on both social welfare and abortion. So, part of the reason why continuing Republican and Democratic activists moved their social welfare, racial, and cultural attitudes in opposite directions (in the aggregate) between 1992 and 2000 was that some activists were adjusting their positions on particular issue dimensions to fit with their ideological identifications or attitudes on other dimensions.

However, issue conversion over this period was not based only in ideology. Part of it clearly was partisan. Even controlling for the influence of ideology and other issue attitudes on attitude change and stability, Republicans were still significantly more likely than Democrats to become more conservative in their social welfare, racial, and abortion attitudes—and in their ideological identifications—between 1992 and 2000. Specifically, the gap between continuing Republican and Democratic activists increased by .03 on racial issues, .05 on abortion, .11 in ideological identification, and a sizeable .17 on social welfare issues. Party-based conversion by individual continuing activists clearly did lead to greater polarization between Democratic and Republican activists on each of these issue dimensions.

[Insert Table 3 About Here]

Table 3 certainly supports the idea that political activists have relatively coherent ideological frameworks and thus mold their positions on some issues to fit with their abstract ideologies and positions on other issues. However, it also suggests that activists are not purely ideological actors whose policy

preferences are impervious to partisanship and the positions of party leaders and fellow activists. Party influences change in activists' issue attitudes above and beyond the effects of ideology and other issue attitudes, and party-based conversion by continuing activists clearly has contributed to conflict extension.

Party Commitment and Party-Based Issue Conversion

Has party-based conversion been most prevalent among the most party-committed activists, as we have argued? To assess that, we estimate this structural equation model separately for each party:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Abortion}_{it} &= \alpha_1 + \lambda_1 \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{11} \text{Soc Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{12} \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{13} \text{Ideol}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{14} \text{Party Commit}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{1,it} \\
 \text{Soc Welf}_{it} &= \alpha_2 + \lambda_2 \text{Soc Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{21} \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{22} \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{23} \text{Ideol}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{24} \text{Party Commit}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{2,it} \\
 \text{Racial}_{it} &= \alpha_3 + \lambda_3 \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{31} \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{32} \text{Soc Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{33} \text{Ideol}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{34} \text{Party Commit}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{3,it} \\
 \text{Ideol}_{it} &= \alpha_4 + \lambda_4 \text{Ideol}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{41} \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{42} \text{Soc Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{43} \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{44} \text{Party Commit}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{4,it} \\
 \text{Party Commit}_{it} &= \alpha_5 + \lambda_5 \text{Party Commit}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{51} \text{Abortion}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{52} \text{Soc Welf}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{53} \text{Racial}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_{54} \text{Ideol}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{5,it}
 \end{aligned}$$

This model is the same as that used to produce Table 3 except that party affiliation has been replaced by party commitment and, unlike party affiliation, we allow party commitment in 2000 to be endogenous to policy preferences and ideology in 1992. Our expectations for the effects of party commitment are plain: activists who are more committed to their parties should be more likely to move their issue attitudes and ideologies toward the dominant positions in their party between 1992 and 2000. We do not have such clear expectations for change in party commitment, but it is possible that activists who share the ascendant issue positions in their party will grow more committed to the party over time.

The observed indicators of latent party commitment in our model are similar to those used to measure activists' party loyalties and commitments in previous research (e.g. Conway and Feigert 1968; Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport 1983; Miller and Jennings 1986). They include self-identified strength of party support, the degree to which presidential campaign activity was motivated by commitment to party, the difference in the respondent's feeling thermometer rating of his or her party and the other party (with higher scores representing more positive ratings of the GOP and more negative ratings of the Democratic party for Republican activists and just the opposite for Democratic activists), the extent to which

the activist saw himself or herself as representing the party organization at the national convention, and whether or not the activist held party office at the time of the survey.³²

These variables all tap into activists' commitments to, affect for, and loyalty to their parties. Accordingly, principal-components factor analyses of the five items in 1992 and in 2000 both produced only one factor, on which all of the indicators loaded strongly.³³ The range of items also seems to capture the psychological, social, and instrumental components of party commitment among activists. Self-identified strength of party support comes closest—both conceptually and in measurement—to the psychological attachment to a party that defines the dominant scholarly perspective on mass partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960) and that activists also are likely to possess. It also may reflect strong social ties to other party activists. Activists whose campaign activity is stimulated by commitments to the party may be motivated by instrumental factors, viewing campaign involvement as a way to enhance their own standing in the party or to acquire public office or its spoils for themselves. Party-based campaign activity also may be driven by psychological loyalties to the party or close social ties to other party activists. The difference in respondents' ratings of the two parties may simply reflect a psychological attachment to one's own party and negative affect for the other party, but also may capture an activist's social identity as being part of one partisan "team" and in opposition to the other team—the "us versus them" aspect of party politics.

Activists who view themselves as representing the party organization at the national convention may do so for instrumental reasons—perhaps improving their own position within the party or helping to produce outcomes at the convention that maximize the party's chances of electoral success—and also because of strong psychological loyalty to the party or social ties to other activists. Finally, party office-holding may reflect the instrumental ingredient of party commitment most closely. Demonstrating commitment to the party and its electoral success may be necessary for activists to win party offices and their success in those offices likely depends on their own commitment to the party and their ability to instill those commitments in fellow activists. Holding party office also should increase activists' social interactions with other people involved in the party as well as their psychological attachments to the party.

Table 4 presents the estimates of the model for each party, and provides strong support for our argument about the role of party commitment. Even controlling for the effects of ideology and other issue

attitudes on issue and ideological change, party commitment had positive effects on change between 1992 and 2000 in social welfare, racial, cultural, and ideological orientations among continuing Republican activists. These effects indicate that Republican activists who are more committed to the party are more likely than other continuing activists to convert toward the GOP's conservative stands on social welfare issues, racial issues, and abortion, and also to move their ideological identifications in a conservative direction. The effects of party commitment on change in social welfare attitudes, racial attitudes, and ideology are all statistically significant, and the effect on change in abortion attitudes approaches standard levels of significance. The effects are also substantively meaningful. The most party-committed Republicans moved .10 units—or one-tenth of the full range of the latent variable—more on social welfare issues than the least-committed GOP activists did between 1992 and 2000. The effect of party commitment on change in racial and abortion attitudes was slightly larger, and the impact on ideological change was particularly large.³⁴ Thus, commitment to the GOP clearly led continuing activists to become more conservative on the whole range of policy dimensions and thus contributed to the growth of Republican conservatism on all of these agendas.

As we expected, the influence of party commitment is noticeably smaller and less consistent among Democrats. The effects are largely in the expected direction, with Democrats with higher levels of party commitment being more likely than their less-party-committed counterparts to convert toward the party's dominant liberal positions on social welfare issues, racial issues, and ideology. The effect is strong and statistically significant on racial issues, but is much weaker and barely approaches significance on social welfare issues and is nowhere close to significant for ideology. On abortion, party commitment's effect is in a pro-life direction, although it does not approach statistical significance. Thus, party commitment does play some role in pushing Democratic activists toward greater liberalism. However, in keeping with the less-party-centered culture of the Democratic party and the fact that its movement toward consistent liberalism began well before the GOP's lurch toward consistent conservatism, the impact of party commitment on change in activists' policy preferences is clearly less impressive among Democrats than Republicans.

[Insert Table 4 About Here]

Despite this asymmetry across the two parties, party commitment clearly played an important role in the development of partisan conflict extension among activists. To get a better sense of its importance, we

conducted two additional analyses. First, we re-estimated the party conversion model in Table 3 for continuing activists in our panel who had low and high levels of party commitment in 1992.³⁵ The results, shown in Table 5, indicate that the effects of party on issue and ideological conversion were substantially and significantly stronger for continuing activists with high levels of party commitment than for their less-party-committed counterparts. Republicans were more likely than Democrats to convert in a conservative direction on social welfare, racial issues, and ideology even among less-committed activists. However, on every dimension, the effect of party on attitude change is obviously stronger for the more party-committed.³⁶

[Insert Table 5 About Here]

Finally, we estimated the level of party polarization on latent abortion, social welfare, and racial attitudes for all activists in 1992 and 2000 with low and high levels of party commitment.³⁷ Table 6 presents the results. Levels of polarization on all three issue dimensions already were higher among party-committed activists than their less-committed counterparts in 1992, but the differences between the two groups had grown even further by 2000. Party differences did increase slightly for the low commitment group, but the increases for highly-committed activists were over three times as large on every dimension.³⁸ For example, on social welfare, the difference in 1992 between Republican and Democratic activists was .48 in the high-commitment group and .40 for the low-commitment group. Over the next eight years, that partisan gap grew to .57 among party-committed activists, but only to .42 among the less committed. Thus, by 2000, party-committed activists were markedly more polarized than less-committed activists on each policy dimension.

[Insert Table 6 About Here]

Conclusion

Conflict extension has characterized recent change among Democratic and Republican party activists. The positions of the two parties' activists have grown more polarized on all three of the major domestic policy agendas—social welfare, racial, and cultural issues—and the views of activists on the three dimensions have grown more closely related, especially in the GOP. This development runs counter to the conventional wisdom that new party conflicts displace old ones during periods of partisan change—a view found both in the broader partisan change literature (Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1983) and in the leading accounts of party activist change (Aldrich 1983b, 1995; Miller and Schofield 2003, 2008).

We have argued that macro-level developments in party politics—the growing presence of policy-oriented activists, the emergence of a participatory nomination process, and the resulting incentives of party candidates and office-holders to stake out ideologically extreme stands on multiple different policy issues—have created opportunities for partisan conflict extension to develop. However, those opportunities would not have been realized if the micro-level assumptions in the activism literature—that activists are motivated purely by policy goals, that they have fixed policy preferences, and that aggregate change among party activists therefore results only from replacement—held. For conflict extension to develop and be sustained, some set of activists needs to convert on issues, bringing their policy preferences closer to the ideologically-extreme stands of party candidates and fellow activists. A key reason for such conversion should be party commitment, which leads activists to bring their own policy attitudes into line with the ascendant positions in the party across a range of issue dimensions.

Our analysis provides strong support both for the emergence of conflict extension among party activists and for our micro-level explanation of it. To be sure, activist turnover played a role in this change. New Democratic and Republican activists exhibited greater attitudinal constraint across issue dimensions and have been more polarized on social welfare, racial, and cultural issues than were the old activists whom they replaced in the parties. However, the growth of party activist polarization across the multiple issue agendas would have been much less substantial without attitudinal conversion among continuing Democratic and Republican activists. Conversion contributed even more than replacement to the increase in polarization on the various issue agendas and, especially among Republicans, to activists' views on those agendas growing more closely related. This conversion resulted in part from activists bringing their attitudes on some issues into line with their views on other issues and their ideological identifications. However, activists' commitment to their parties also has been a critical factor. Party commitment pushed activists' policy attitudes toward the ascendant positions in their parties, especially in the GOP, and partisan issue polarization is most prevalent among the activists with the highest levels of party commitment.

These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of American party politics. First, and most fundamentally, they identify what may be a key reason for why the parties in government and in the electorate have grown increasingly polarized on multiple policy dimensions—namely

the parties' activist bases growing more polarized on multiple dimensions. Our paucity of over-time data prevented rigorous tests of causal ordering. However, we have shown that increases in activist polarization on social welfare, cultural, and racial issues coincided with the growth of party issue differences in Congress and the electorate, and, at least on the abortion issue, may have been the force behind that growth.

Second, our findings point to continuing differences in the culture of the two parties, with party commitment being stronger and more consequential for policy preferences among Republican activists than for active Democrats. This comports with the views of other scholars that party commitment is stronger in the GOP and means different things for Republicans and Democrats, and that the recent surge in party polarization has been driven more by the growth of consistent conservatism in the GOP than by increases in Democratic liberalism. Third, the fact that conflict extension among activists rests heavily on attitudinal conversion among continuing activists should make it a more stable and permanent condition of the political landscape. That is true because conversion increases the proportion of activists with ideologically-extreme policy positions on multiple issue dimensions and because individuals who have been active in the past are more likely than political newcomers to remain active in the future.

Finally, despite the significant differences between partisan change at the activist and mass levels, our findings suggest a key similarity. Among party activists and in the parties' mass coalitions, conflict extension is facilitated by individuals with strong party commitments bringing their policy attitudes into line with the ascendant positions in their parties (see Layman and Carsey 2002a, 2002b; Carsey and Layman 2006 for the mass-level evidence). Thus, this paper reinforces the view that partisanship acts as a moving force in politics. Students of mass political behavior have shown that party identification fundamentally shapes policy preferences and political evaluations rather than simply reflecting them (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 2002), while a number of congressional scholars demonstrate an independent role for party in shaping legislative behavior (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sinclair 1995; Lee 2009). We have shown something similar here. Parties are not simply vehicles through which political activists pursue their policy goals. For many activists, party support is a goal in its own right, motivating political involvement and shaping policy preferences, and such commitments are a potent force in structuring party change.

Notes

1. Activists, of course, are not the only cause of increased party polarization identified in the literature. Several scholars contend that the rise of partisanship in Congress results in part from the increasing restrictiveness of congressional rules, the increasingly ideological character of party leaders, and the growing ability of majority party leaders to control the congressional agenda, committee assignments, and other key resources (Rohde 1991; Cox & McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1997, 2000; Sinclair 1995, 1997, 2006; Roberts and Smith 2003). Others focus on electoral and societal changes such as the partisan realignment of the white South, partisan redistricting, Hispanic immigration, growing income inequality, growing residential segregation along racial and class lines, and increasing residential mobility (Polsby 2005; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; Brewer and Stonecash 2006; Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001; Oppenheimer 2005). Another perspective is that ideological change in the parties is prompted by political thinkers and writers who develop the ideological perspectives that structure the beliefs and actions of party leaders and activists (Noel 2006).
2. That conflict displacement may not have characterized partisan change even in earlier political eras parallels one of the challenges to the traditional party realignment perspective. Mayhew (2002) uses Gerring's (1998) evidence on party ideologies to argue that the periods generally considered to be realigning eras do not coincide with clear shifts in the policy cleavages between the major parties. Gerring's evidence also suggests that the parties have differed on multiple issue agendas throughout their history.
3. Our argument highlights the role of strategic party elites in putting together such packages (see also Gerring 1998), while Noel (2006) contends that ideological "thinkers"—pundits, opinion purveyors, and intellectuals—play the key role in issue bundling while party leaders and candidates use the bundles for electoral competition.
4. Two caveats are in order. First, a few scholars contend that Democratic shifts to the left have been at least as important as Republican moves to the right for recent increases in governmental polarization (e.g. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003). Second, if Republican office-holders have moved to the right more than Democrats have moved leftward, it may be the result of greater increases in ideological extremity among Republican activists than Democratic activists rather than the cause. However, from the standpoint of individual activists being pulled toward more extreme policy positions, patterns among office-holders still may act as a causal force even if those patterns were caused by aggregate change among party activists.

5. We have some initial evidence for both of these expectations. First, on the party commitment variable that we describe below and operationalize with panel data on national convention delegates in 1992 and 2000, the Republican mean is slightly but significantly higher than that for Democrats (difference of .05 on a 0 to 1 scale, $p=.003$). Second, using the same data, we constructed a measure of policy commitment (based on questions about the degree to which delegates are involved in politics to get the party and its candidates to support certain policies and the extent to which delegates' activity in the 1992 presidential campaign was motivated by issue commitments). The correlation between party commitment and policy commitment is small and negative for both parties, but it is larger and more statistically significant for Republicans ($r=-.18$, $p=.008$) than for Democrats ($r=-.07$, $p=.13$). It does appear that Republican activists are slightly more party committed than Democratic activists and that there is a bit more tension between party commitment and issue commitment in the GOP than in the Democratic activist base.

6. In a study of 2000 national convention delegates that we employ, over 87% of both Democrats and Republicans placed themselves at either 6 or 7 on a 1-to-7 scale of "how strongly you support your political party." Nearly 62% of Democrats and 66% of Republicans said that "a lot" of their activity in the 2000 presidential campaign was motivated by being "committed to party work."

7. See Miller and Jennings (1986), Herrera (1992), and Layman (2001) for more details about each of these surveys. There was no CDS survey conducted in 1976 or 1996.

8. Like all of the earlier CDS surveys, the 2000 CDS was a mail survey. For the cross-sectional portion of the study, we mailed surveys to all of the delegates to the 2000 Democratic and Republican national conventions for whom we had correct address information (4,284 Democrats and 2,049 Republicans). Our response rate was 39 percent, which is comparable to response rates for earlier CDS surveys. For the panel study, we mailed surveys to 1,888 respondents to the 1992 CDS for whom we had correct address information, and our response rate was 48 percent, resulting in a panel of 911 respondents. Some of the respondents in the panel were also delegates to the 2000 conventions and are included in the 2000 delegate cross-section so that we have data on 1,907 delegates to the 2000 Democratic convention and 985 delegates to the 2000 Republican convention. There are more Democrats than Republicans in our sample because there were roughly twice as many delegates to the Democratic National Convention as there were to the Republican National Convention in 2000.

9. We sent e-mails to all of the 2004 national convention delegates for whom we had valid e-mail addresses (2,730 Democrats and 605 Republicans) asking them to participate in our online survey. Our rather low response rates—21

percent among Democrats and 22 percent among Republicans—resulted in samples of 578 Democratic delegates and 134 Republicans. Because of the very small Republican sample, we conducted a follow-up mail survey of GOP delegates, and we received an additional 260 completed surveys. Despite the different (and mixed) format of this study and its rather low response rates, the distribution of basic demographic and political variables in the 2004 CDS is, for both parties, quite similar to those in the 2000 CDS and in the surveys of 2004 national convention delegates conducted by CBS and the *New York Times*. Nevertheless, we make very limited use of the 2004 data, using them only to provide a data point for the most recent presidential election year in our first three figures.

10. There were 11 cultural, social welfare, or racial issues that were asked about in both 1992 and 2000 with the same question wording and response options. In contrast, there were only four cultural, social welfare, or racial issues that were asked about in each of the 1988, 1992, and 2000 surveys.

11. Due to inconsistency in the questions asked in the various CDS surveys, we use a different set of issues for the analysis in each year (see Appendix A for a list of these issues). Thus, comparisons over time should be viewed with caution. We estimate our models using Amos 4.0, which computes full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates even in the presence of missing data (Andersen 1957). Wothke and Arbuckle (1996) describe the FIML procedure used by Amos and show that the estimates produced by it are more consistent and efficient than those produced by methods using pairwise or listwise deletion of missing observations.

12. The one exception to this is in 1980, when there was only one indicator of social welfare attitudes and one indicator of racial attitudes. For all of the other years, and for cultural attitudes in 1980, we take into account measurement error in each observed indicator. To provide a scale for the latent variables, we constrain the factor loading for one observed indicator to be equal to one. All observed indicators are coded to range from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). Before we estimated the party polarization model in each year, we estimated three different measurement models: one with all of the issues loading on a single latent variable, one with all of the social welfare and racial issues loading on a single dimension and the cultural issues forming a separate dimension, and one with racial, social welfare, and cultural issues all loading on separate factors. Although the correlations between the three factors are generally quite strong, the chi-square difference test—the difference between the overall fit for a model with more latent factors and that for a model with fewer latent factors (Kline 1998)—indicates that a three-factor solution explains a significantly ($p < .001$) larger proportion of the variance in observed policy attitudes than does a one- or two-factor solution in each year.

13. The difference between the party means is significant ($p < .001$) on each issue dimension in each year.
14. To test whether the changes over time in levels of party polarization on the three issue dimensions were statistically significant, we constrained the level of polarization (i.e. the effect of the party dummy variable on the latent issue variables) on a particular issue dimension in 2004 to equal the level of polarization on that dimension in 1972, and computed the chi-square difference test for the goodness of fit of the constrained and unconstrained models in 2004. Each of those chi-square difference tests were highly significant ($p < .0001$), indicating that party polarization grew significantly on each of the three issue dimensions.
15. The value computed for each respondent was his or her mean score on all of the issues in each dimension on which he or she had non-missing values.
16. The percentage of Republican activists with right-of-center positions on social welfare issues was 31 in 1972, 37 in 1988, and 77 in 2004. The percentage of active Republicans with conservative views on cultural issues was 42 in 1972, 61 in 1988, and 70 in 2004. On racial issues Republican conservatism has not increased much, from 77 percent in 1972 to 80 percent in 2004. The percentage of Democratic activists with liberal positions increased between 1972 and 2004 on every issue dimension, but only slightly (from 77 percent to 98 percent on social welfare, from 74 percent to 79 percent on race, and from 82 percent to 91 percent on culture).
17. The list of all of the roll-call votes used to construct the congressional party polarization measures and more details on those measures are presented in Appendix B. The cultural issue measure was based on roll-calls dealing with issues such as abortion, homosexual rights, gay marriage, the Equal Rights Amendment, prayer and other religious expression in the public square, government's relationship to religious schools, and funding of "pornographic" or "obscene" art by the National Endowment for the Arts. The racial issue measure was based on bills dealing with topics such as civil rights, voting rights, or equal opportunity for African Americans and other racial minorities; discrimination, racism, hate crimes, racism, or racial profiling against African Americans and other racial minorities; segregation and desegregation; fair housing laws; busing; and affirmative action programs. The social welfare issue measure was based on a wide variety of bills touching on the social welfare role of government. These included bills on direct welfare assistance programs; welfare reform programs; government help for the elderly, homeless, disabled, and needy; and social security.
18. The pro-life percentage of each party in the House and Senate is simply the mean percentage of the party's members voting on the pro-life side of all bills involving abortion in a given year. We took the yearly difference in

party means in both chambers and then averaged the House and Senate differences to produce the measure of party polarization on abortion. For activists and the electorate, we used the four-category abortion items in the NES and CDS. We show the response options over time in the two surveys in Appendix C. We coded the two most restrictive options as pro-life and the least restrictive option as pro-choice. To make the mass and activist measures of party polarization on abortion as comparable as possible to the congressional measure—based on yes or no roll-call votes on abortion legislation—we eliminated the option in between the two most restrictive options and the least restrictive option (e.g. “permit abortion for [other] reasons . . . but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established”). We then took the percentage of the remaining activists or identifiers who were on the pro-life side. Party polarization on abortion is the difference between this percentage for Republicans and Democrats.

19. By comparison, Carmines’ and Stimson’s (1989: 169-180) analysis of the relationship between racial issue change in Congress and in the parties’ mass coalitions employs annual data over a period as long as 36 years. Further increasing the caution that we must exercise in assessing relationships between activist, congressional, and mass polarization is that, because the CDS surveys were not conducted in 1976 and 1996, levels of party polarization on each dimension for those years are simply the average of the levels in the preceding and subsequent election year.

20. Further descriptions of these analyses are presented in Appendix D.

21. The small number of time points in our analysis means that we should view these results with considerable caution. However, they do confirm the findings that Layman and Carsey (2002a, 2002b) uncover with a different approach and far more observations. Layman and Carsey show that the movement to more polarized and constrained positions across different policy dimensions has been confined primarily to party identifiers who are aware of the parties’ differences on various policy issues, and take that as evidence for mass-level conflict extension occurring in response to developments in the policy positions of party elites and activists.

22. The six social welfare questions are about the proper level of government services and spending, government providing health insurance, and whether or not federal government spending on child care, welfare programs, programs that assist the unemployed, and aid to public schools should be increased, decreased, or kept at the same level. The two racial issue questions ask about government responsibility to help African-Americans and federal spending on programs to assist blacks. The three indicators of abortion attitudes are the respondents’ views on the legality of abortion, feeling thermometer ratings of pro-life groups, and thermometer ratings of pro-choice groups. Attitudes on government services and spending, health insurance, and help for blacks are measured on seven-point

scales with identical questions and response options as those used in the National Election Studies (NES). Abortion attitude is a four-point scale (see Appendix C). The federal spending items are all three-category variables ranging from increase to decrease. We employ feeling thermometer ratings (ranging from 0 to 100) as measures of abortion attitudes for two reasons. First, the only question about cultural policy with the same wording in the 1992 and 2000 surveys is the one on abortion, and we need more than one observed indicator of cultural attitudes in order to correct for measurement error when we examine change in individual activists' issue attitudes between the two panel waves. Second, unlike social groups that may be associated with a set of political issues but exist apart from the issues (e.g. poor people and social welfare issues), pro-life and pro-choice groups exist only in relation to the abortion issue. So, feelings toward these groups should be good indicators of actual attitudes toward abortion policy.

23. Constraining the level of polarization on each issue dimension in 2000 to equal the level in 1992 and computing the difference in chi-square for the constrained and unconstrained models in 2000 shows that the growth in polarization on all three issue variables was statistically significant ($p < .001$).

24. Because delegates to a particular year's national convention are very likely to be active in subsequent campaigns even if they are not delegates in those years (Miller and Jennings 1986), the large majority (over 82 percent) of individuals who responded to both the 1992 and 2000 CDS were active in the presidential campaigns in both years.

25. There are 722 of these individuals (459 Democrats and 263 Republicans) in our panel study.

26. According to Rapoport and Stone (1994), the contribution of conversion to overall issue change is $\alpha(S_2 - S_1)$, where α is the proportion of time 1 activists that remain active through time 2 (.83 here), S_2 is mean opinion of stayers at time 2, and S_1 is the mean opinion of stayers at time 1. The contribution of replacement is $(1 - \alpha)(N_2 - D_1)$, where $1 - \alpha$ is the proportion of time 1 activists dropping out at time 2, N_2 is the mean opinion of Newcomers at time 2, and D_1 is the mean opinion of Dropouts at time 1. Using these formulas and replacing mean opinion with the difference in party means at time 1 and time 2, the contribution of replacement to the increase in party polarization between 1992 and 2000 is .02 $((1 - .83) \times (.47 - .37))$ on abortion (29.4% of the overall increase in party polarization on abortion), .02 (31.5%) on social welfare, and .02 (29.1%) on racial issues. The contribution of conversion to increased polarization is .04 $(.83 \times (.41 - .36))$ on abortion (70.6% of the overall increase), .03 (68.5%) on social welfare, and .05 (70.9%) on racial issues.

27. It is worth noting that the correlations among all activists are generally higher than comparable correlations in the mass electorate. Layman and Carsey (2002a: 795) report correlations between cultural, racial, and social welfare

attitudes in 2000 by strength of partisanship. The correlations between attitudes on cultural and social welfare issues, cultural and racial issues, and social welfare and racial issues were .30, .24, and .81 among strong partisans, .36, .31, and .65 among weak partisans and independent “leaners,” and .11, -.17, and .68 for “pure” independents.

28. Applying the Rapoport and Stone (1994) formulas to changes in attitude constraint shows that conversion contributed more than replacement to changes in constraint across the three issue dimensions. For the growth of .09 in the correlation between abortion and social welfare preferences among all activists, replacement’s contribution was .04 and conversion’s was .05. For the growth of .07 in the abortion and racial attitude correlation, replacement’s contribution was .03 and conversion’s was .04. For the .01 increase in the social welfare and racial correlation, replacement’s contribution was .002 and conversion’s was .008.

29. The very small samples of Republican drop-outs and newcomers in our panel created difficulties for the estimation of our three-factor model for these groups. So, for both drop-outs and newcomers in the GOP, we estimated a two-factor model that combined social welfare and racial attitudes into a single factor.

30. As in preceding analyses, social welfare, racial, and cultural attitudes are latent variables with corrections for measurement error in the observed indicators. We allow the measurement errors for each observed indicator to be correlated across the two panel waves. However, because we only have a single indicator of ideology (self-placement on a seven-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative), it is simply an observed variable with no measurement error correction.

31. Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the estimates of the structural portions of our various models: the causal relationships across time between party (or party commitment in Table 4), issue attitudes, and ideology. The estimates of the measurement portions of the models—the confirmatory factor loadings of observed indicators on latent variables—and any structural estimates not shown in the tables are displayed in Appendix E.

32. More details about the measurement of these indicators and their distributions among our panel respondents are provided in Appendix F.

33. In the 1992 wave of the panel, the first factor had an eigenvalue of 1.96 and explained 39.3% of the variance in the five items, and the factor loadings for those items ranged from .53 to .76. In the 2000 wave, that factor had an eigenvalue of 1.82 and explained 36.3% of the variance in the items, and the factor loadings ranged from .48 to .73.

34. The size of the discrepancy between party commitment’s effect on change in ideology and change in policy attitudes is likely due to our inability to correct for measurement error in ideological identification.

35. To classify panel respondents' levels of party commitment in 1992, we created a factor score from the principal-components factor analysis of the five indicators of party commitment. We classified those respondents in the bottom 50 percent of the factor score values as having low party commitment and those in the top 50 percent as having high party commitment. Because our samples of low and high commitment activists are considerably smaller than the overall number of continuing activists, we simplified the model somewhat, dropping the lagged effects of views on particular issue dimensions on views on other dimensions. So, each policy attitude in 2000 is a function of its own value in 1992, ideology in 1992, and party. Ideology in 2000 is a function of its 1992 value and party.

36. To test the differences between the effects of party for the low commitment and high commitment groups, we estimated our model simultaneously for the two groups two different times. The first time, we allowed all of the parameters in the model, including the four parameters for the effect of party on issue and ideological change, to be different across the two groups. The second time, we constrained those four parameters to be equal for the two groups. The difference in the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistics for the unconstrained and constrained estimations— itself distributed as a chi-square variable with degrees of freedom equal to the number of constraints imposed in the second estimation (four in this case)—tests whether there are statistically significant differences in the four parameters across the two groups. The difference was clearly significant ($\chi^2 = 19.87, p < .001$).

37. In other words, we re-estimated the basic party polarization model used to determine the levels of polarization for all 1992 and 2000 activists in the first part of Table 1 for low and high party commitment activists. Here, we returned to the cross-sectional surveys in 1992 and 2000 surveys, computed factor scores from principal-components factor analyses of our five indicators of party commitment for all activists in 1992 and 2000 (both producing only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one and with all of the indicators loading at .47 or higher on that single factor in both years), and divided the scores in half to identify the low and high commitment groups.

38. To test the increases in party polarization between 1992 and 2000 for low and high commitment activists, we estimated the model simultaneously for low commitment activists in 1992 and in 2000 and then simultaneously for high commitment activists in 1992 and in 2000. The differences in the chi-square statistics for the model in which all of the parameters are unconstrained for activists in the two years and for the model in which the effects of party are constrained to be equal for activists in the two years indicate that the increase in party polarization for low commitment activists was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 10.57, df=3, p < .02$), but the increase for high commitment activists was much more significant ($\chi^2 = 47.64, df=3, p < .00001$).

Appendix A: Issues Included in Analysis of Party Polarization Over Time (Figure 1)

- 1972: *Social Welfare:* Work requirements for welfare recipients, government action against inflation.
Racial: Busing to achieve school integration, stopping crime vs. protecting rights of the accused.
Cultural: Abortion, support for women's liberation movement.
- 1980: *Social Welfare:* Government efforts to reduce inflation vs. unemployment. *Racial:* Busing to achieve school integration. *Cultural:* Abortion, equal rights amendment (ERA).
- 1984: *Social Welfare:* Federal spending on public schools, federal spending on social security, federal spending on medicare. *Racial:* Busing to achieve school integration, federal spending on assistance to minorities. *Cultural:* Abortion, ERA, prayer in public schools.
- 1988: *Social Welfare:* Federal spending on aid to education, federal spending on social security, federal spending on care for elderly, federal spending on the homeless, federal spending on child care.
Racial: Busing for school integration, government help for blacks, federal spending on assistance to minorities. *Cultural:* Abortion, prayer in public schools, ERA, role of women.
- 1992: *Social Welfare:* Government services and spending, government providing health insurance, federal spending on aid to public schools, federal spending on social security, federal spending on assisting the homeless, federal spending on child care, federal spending on welfare programs, federal spending on aid to poor people, federal spending on programs that assist the unemployed.
Racial: Government help for blacks, federal spending on programs that assist blacks, dealing with problems of urban unrest. *Cultural:* Abortion, women's role, prayer in public schools, feeling thermometer rating of pro-life groups, thermometer rating of pro-choice groups.
- 2000: *Social Welfare:* Government services and spending, government providing health insurance, federal spending on aid to public schools, federal spending on child care, federal spending on welfare programs, federal spending on programs that assist the unemployed, social security privatization, using budget surplus for tax cuts. *Racial:* Government help for blacks, federal spending on programs that assist blacks, racial minorities given preference in hiring and promotion. *Cultural:* Abortion, prayer in public schools, feeling thermometer rating of pro-life

groups, thermometer rating of pro-choice groups, government efforts to protect homosexuals from job discrimination, parental consent for teenager to have an abortion.

2004: *Social Welfare*: Government services and spending, government providing health insurance, federal spending on aid to public schools, federal spending on child care, federal spending on welfare programs, federal spending on programs that assist the unemployed, social security privatization. *Racial*: Government help for blacks, federal spending on programs that assist blacks. *Cultural*: Abortion, legality of gay marriage, federal funding of stem cell research.

Appendix B: Congressional Votes on Cultural, Racial, and Social Welfare Issues

The congressional party alignment on cultural issues from 1972 through 1996 was taken from Layman (2001: 213, 407-409). The congressional party alignment on racial issues from 1972 through 1980 was taken from Carmines and Stimson (1989: 63-64, 84-88). The congressional party alignments on cultural issues in 2000 and 2004, racial issues from 1984 through 2004, and social welfare issues from 1972 through 2004 were computed from the votes listed below. The cultural and racial votes are listed by *Congressional Quarterly* roll-call numbers. Because there were no racial issue votes in Congress in 1996 or 2004, we used the congressional party alignment on racial issues in 1995 and 2003 as our 1996 and 2004 measures, respectively. The social welfare votes are all of the substantive votes in presidential election years within the “Social Services and Disabilities” category under the “Floor Votes by Topic” menu on the CQ Press Congress Collection website (<http://library.cqpress.com/congress>). We searched for all floor votes rather than just the CQ “key votes.” The social welfare votes are listed by the bill number and the website’s document identification number.

To form the party polarization measure in each year, we did the following: First, we computed the mean proportion of Republican House members and of Democratic House members taking the conservative side on all of the bills in each issue domain in each year and took the difference between the Republican mean and the Democratic mean. This is our measure of party polarization in the House on a particular domain in a particular year. Second, we computed party polarization in the Senate in each year and issue domain in the same way. Third, we took the average of the House and Senate party polarization measures. This is our measure of congressional party polarization on the particular domain in each year.

Cultural Issues, 2000 and 2004 (Congressional Quarterly Roll-Call Numbers):

House: **2000** H.102, 103, 104, 203, 318, 371, 373, 396, 422, 473, 481. **2004** H.30, 31, 197, 410, 426, 466, 467, 473, 484.
Senate: **2000** S.2, 134, 136, 169. **2004** S.61, 63, 114, 134, 155.

Racial Issues, 1984-2004 (Congressional Quarterly Roll-Call Numbers):

House: **1984** H.243. **1988** H.41, 138, 213. **1992** H.61. **1995** H. 319. **2000** H.146, 470.
Senate: **1984** S.112. **1988** S.67, 369. **1995** S.317, 375. **2000** S.135. **2003** S.20.

Social Welfare Issue, 1972-2004: Bill Numbers and Document ID's from the CQ Press Congress Collection

Year and Category*	Chamber	Bill #	Document ID**
<i>Welfare and Welfare Reform</i>			
1972	House	S3617	rc1972-218-18419-988748
1972	House	S3617	rc1972-218-18419-988750
1972	House	S3617	rc1972-218-18419-988747
1972	House	S3617	rc1972-218-18419-988749
1972	House	HR15417	rc1972-218-18419-988770
1972	House	HR12350	rc1972-218-18419-988781
1972	House	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-988995
1972	Senate	HR1	catn69-6-8895-500162
1972	Senate	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-989037
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586379
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586381
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586377
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586403
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586407
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586399
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586405
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586395
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586397
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586419
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586417
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586421
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586423
1976	Senate	S3136	catn73-7-8887-499905
1976	House	HR14970	rc1976-214-9691-609561
1976	Senate	HR10210	rc1976-214-9341-587078
1976	Senate	HR10210	rc1976-214-9341-587080
1976	Senate	HR7228	rc1976-214-9341-587101
1976	House	HR10210	rc1976-214-9691-609572
1980	House	S1309	catn77-8-8891-500056
1980	House	S1309	rc1980-210-9334-582252
1980	House	S1309	rc1980-210-9334-582257
1980	House	S1309	rc1980-210-9334-582258
1980	House	S1309	rc1980-210-9334-582253
1980	House	S1309	rc1980-210-9334-582255
1980	House	S1309	rc1980-210-9334-582254
1980	House	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9334-582261
1980	House	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9334-582260
1980	House	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9334-582269
1980	House	S1309	rc1980-210-9334-582265
1984	House	HR5394	rc1984-206-9327-579083
1988	Senate	S1511	catn85-10-5251-269208
1988	House	HR1720	catn85-10-5251-269223
1988	House	HR1720	rc1988-202-9319-576051
1992	Senate	S2	rc1992-198-9310-572385
1992	Senate	HR4210	rc1992-198-9310-572424
1992	Senate	SConRes	rc1992-198-9310-572456
1996	Senate	S1664	rc1996-194-9302-568406
1996	House	HR3562	rc1996-194-9303-568838

1996	House	HR3562	rc1996-194-9303-568839
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568513
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568515
1996	House	HR3734	rc1996-194-9303-568946
1996	House	HR3734	rc1996-194-9303-568949
1996	House	HR3734	rc1996-194-9303-568948
1996	House	HR3734	rc1996-194-9303-568947
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568518
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568519
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568521
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568522
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568517
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568523
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568520
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568537
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568532
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568529
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568540
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568535
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568536
1996	Senate	HR3734	rc1996-194-9302-568544
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568542
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568527
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568525
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568524
1996	Senate	S1956	rc1996-194-9302-568538
1996	House	HR3734	catn93-12-5259-269760
1996	House	HR3734	rc1996-194-9303-568999
1996	House	HR3734	rc1996-194-9303-569000
1996	Senate	HR3734	catn93-12-5259-269744
2000	House	HR3081	rc2000-190-9295-564965
2000	House	HR4678	rc2000-190-9295-565381
2004	House	HR4766	rc2004-235-10325-662730

*Children, Youth, and
Families*

1972	House	HR15417	rc1972-218-18419-988767
1972	House	HR15417	rc1972-218-18419-988766
1972	Senate	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-989022
1972	Senate	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-989038
1972	Senate	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-989034
1972	Senate	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-989035
1976	Senate	HR9803	rc1976-214-9341-586183
1976	Senate	HR9803	rc1976-214-9341-586185
1976	Senate	HR9803	rc1976-214-9341-586187
1976	Senate	HR9803	rc1976-214-9341-586189
1976	House	HR9803	rc1976-214-9691-608999
1976	House	HR9803	rc1976-214-9691-609000
1976	House	HR9803	rc1976-214-9691-609000
1976	Senate	HR9803	rc1976-214-9341-586333
1976	Senate	S3136	rc1976-214-9341-586401
1976	House	HR9803	rc1976-214-9691-609083

1976	Senate	HR9803	rc1976-214-9341-586479
1976	Senate	HR12455	rc1976-214-9341-586525
1976	House	HR14232	rc1976-214-9691-609240
1976	House	HR14232	rc1976-214-9691-609252
1976	House	HR12455	rc1976-214-9691-609294
1976	House	HR12455	rc1976-214-9691-609295
1976	Senate	HR12455	rc1976-214-9341-586936
1976	Senate	HR12455	rc1976-214-9341-586935
1980	Senate	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9335-582794
1980	Senate	S2675	rc1980-210-9335-582962
1980	Senate	S2675	rc1980-210-9335-582960
1980	House	HR6711	rc1980-210-9334-582491
1984	House	HR7	rc1984-206-9327-579074
1984	House	HR7	rc1984-206-9327-579101
1984	Senate	HR2163	rc1984-206-9326-578830
1984	House	HR5600	rc1984-206-9327-579209
1984	Senate	HR5743	rc1984-206-9326-578944
1988	Senate	S2560	rc1988-202-9318-575612
1988	Senate	S2560	rc1988-202-9318-575613
1988	Senate	S2488	rc1988-202-9318-575700
1988	Senate	S2488	rc1988-202-9318-575711
1992	Senate	SConRes106	rc1992-198-9310-572451
1992	Senate	SConRes106	rc1992-198-9310-572457
1992	Senate	HR5132	rc1992-198-9310-572487
1992	Senate	HR5132	rc1992-198-9310-572484
1992	House	HR3603	rc1992-198-9311-573008
1992	House	HR3603	rc1992-198-9311-573006
1992	House	HR3603	rc1992-198-9311-573009
1992	House	HR3603	rc1992-198-9311-573007
1992	House	HR5487	rc1992-198-9311-573015
1992	Senate	HR5677	rc1992-198-9310-572586
1996	House	HJRes134	rc1996-194-9303-568627
1996	Senate	HR3666	rc1996-194-9302-568588
2000	House	HR4577	rc2000-190-9295-565197
2000	Senate	HR4810	rc2000-190-9294-564831
2000	Senate	HR4810	rc2000-190-9294-564824
2000	Senate	HR4810	rc2000-190-9294-564832
2000	Senate	HR4810	rc2000-190-9294-564830
2004	Senate	SConRes95	rc2004-235-10328-663033
2004	Senate	HR4	rc2004-235-10328-663045

Disabilities

1972	Senate	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-988989
1976	House	HR13172	rc1976-214-9691-609053
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582680
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582679
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582675
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582676
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582681
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582683
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582682
1980	House	HR3236	rc1980-210-9334-582281
1980	House	HR7831	rc1980-210-9334-582454

2000	Senate	SConRes101	rc2000-190-9294-564698
2000	Senate	HR4577	rc2000-190-9294-564785
2000	Senate	HR4577	rc2000-190-9294-564796
2004	Senate	S1248	rc2004-235-10328-663073
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<i>Elderly</i>			
1972	House	S1163	rc1972-218-18418-988226
1972	House	HR15657	rc1972-218-18418-988388
1972	Senate	HR15657	rc1972-218-18419-989008
1976	House	S126	rc1976-214-9691-609141
1976	House	HR14232	rc1976-214-9691-609248
1976	House	S3295	rc1976-214-9691-609278
1976	House	S3295	rc1976-214-9691-609279
1976	House	HR14514	rc1976-214-9691-609345
1976	House	HR14514	rc1976-214-9691-609344
1980	House	HR6417	rc1980-210-9334-582643
1988	House	HR3436	rc1988-202-9319-575907
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<i>General Policy</i>			
1976	House	HR12972	rc1976-214-9691-609111
1980	Senate	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9335-582796
1980	Senate	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9335-582792
1980	Senate	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9335-582793
1980	Senate	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9335-582795
1980	Senate	S1309	rc1980-210-9335-582790
1980	Senate	S1309	rc1980-210-9335-582789
1980	Senate	HJRes545	rc1980-210-9335-582802
1980	House	HR7859	rc1980-210-9334-582590
1984	House	HR5145	rc1984-206-9327-579204
1984	House	HR5151	rc1984-206-9327-579310
1992	House	HConRes287	rc1992-198-9311-572685
1996	House	HR3019	rc1996-194-9302-568353
1996	Senate	SConRes57	rc1996-194-9302-568441
1996	House	HR3755	rc1996-194-9303-568931
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<i>Homelessness</i>			
1984	Senate	HR6040	rc1984-206-9326-578935
1988	House	HR4352	rc1988-202-9319-575986
1988	House	HR4352	rc1988-202-9319-575985
1988	House	HR4352	rc1988-202-9319-575984
1996	House	HR3666	rc1996-194-9303-568888
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<i>Social Security</i>			
1972	Senate	HR15390	rc1972-218-18419-988782
1972	Senate	HR15390	rc1972-218-18419-988783
1972	Senate	HR15390	rc1972-218-18419-988788
1972	Senate	HR15390	rc1972-218-18419-988784
1972	Senate	HR1	rc1972-218-18419-989019
1976	House	HR12945	rc1976-214-9691-609139
1976	House	HR8911	rc1976-214-9691-609418
1976	House	HR8911	rc1976-214-9691-609419
1980	Senate	HR3236	rc1980-210-9335-582684
1988	House	HR4783	rc1988-202-9319-575916
1992	House	HR4210	rc1992-198-9311-572700

1992	Senate	HR4210	rc1992-198-9310-572432
1992	House	HR4210	rc1992-198-9311-572699
1992	House	HR4210	rc1992-198-9311-572701
1992	Senate	SConRes106	rc1992-198-9310-572453
2000	Senate	HR5	rc2000-190-9294-564667
2000	House	HConRes290	rc2000-190-9295-564999
2000	House	HConRes290	rc2000-190-9295-565000
2000	Senate	HR8	rc2000-190-9294-564814
2000	Senate	HR8	rc2000-190-9294-564818
2000	House	HR4865	rc2000-190-9295-565374
2000	House	HR4865	rc2000-190-9295-565375
2000	House	HR4865	rc2000-190-9295-565372
2004	House	HR4279	rc2004-235-10325-662525

Source: CQ Press Congress Collection (<http://library.cqpress.com/congress>)

* “Category” indicates in which of the seven categories listed under the “Social Services and Disabilities” heading on the CQ website the vote fell.

** Document ID serves as an extension on the main URL of the website. For example, if the Document ID is “rc1972-218-18419-988748”, then the floor vote can be accessed through the URL <http://library.cqpress.com/congress/rc1972-218-18419-988748>.

Appendix C: Response Options on Abortion in the CDS and NES Surveys

American National Election Studies (NES)

1972 and 1976

- (1) Abortion should never be permitted
- (2) Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in danger
- (3) Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring for the child
- (4) Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should not require a woman to have a child she doesn't want.

1980 -2004

- (1) By law, abortion should never be permitted
- (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger
- (3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established
- (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

Convention Delegate Studies (CDS)

1972

- (1) Abortion should never be permitted
- (2) Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in danger
- (3) If a woman and her doctor agree, she should be able to have a legal abortion
- (4) Any woman who wants to have an abortion should be able to have one.

1980-1988

- (1) Abortion should never be permitted
- (2) Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in danger
- (3) Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring for the child
- (4) Abortion should never be forbidden (“prohibited” in 1988).

1992 to 2004: CDS response options were identical to the 1980-2004 NES response options.

Appendix D: Time Series Analyses of Activist, Congressional, and Mass Polarization

We conducted two very basic sets of causality tests of the relationships between congressional party polarization, party activist polarization, and mass party polarization on abortion. The most basic tests are Granger Causality tests, where we regress one series on its own past value and the past value of another series: $Y_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Y_{t-1} + \beta_1 X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$. We use single lags due to small sample sizes. If the past value of X has a significant effect on the current value of Y in these models, then X may be said to Granger cause Y (Granger 1969). We also consider the most general error correction model (ECM) suggested by De Boef and Keele (2008). We regress the change from one time point to the next in a series on the past value of that series, the past value of another series, and change in the second series: $\Delta Y_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Y_{t-1} + \beta_0 \Delta X_t + \beta_1 X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$. Here, a joint F-test on β_0 and β_1 is the appropriate test of whether X causes Y. We estimate a total of six sets of Granger Causality models and ECMs. The results are shown in Table C1.

We find that activist polarization spurs congressional polarization on abortion (column 1), but congressional party divisions do not cause changes in activist polarization (column 2). The Granger causality tests show a causal effect of activist polarization on polarization in Congress ($p=.01$), but no significant effect of congressional polarization on abortion differences among party activists ($p=.84$). The joint F-test in the ECM is statistically significant ($p=.06$) for activist polarization's effect on congressional party divergence, but is not significant ($p=.87$) for the congressional series' effect on activist polarization.

We also find that changes in levels of abortion polarization among party activists and the parties in Congress cause changes in mass party polarization (columns 3 and 5), but that the reverse is not true (column 4 and 6). In the Granger Causality tests, congressional and activist polarization Granger cause mass polarization (two-tailed $p<.10$ in both tests), but mass polarization does not Granger cause either activist polarization or polarization in Congress on abortion ($p>.2$ in both tests). The joint F-tests in the ECMs suggest that activist and congressional polarization on abortion produce changes in mass-level polarization ($p<.10$ in both tests), but mass polarization does not exert a causal influence on abortion differences among party activists or the parties in Congress ($p>.5$ in both tests).

Table D1: Tests of Causality in the Relationships between Party Polarization among Party Activists, the Parties in Congress, and the Parties in the Electorate on Abortion, 1972-2004

Type of Causal Model and Independent Variables	Causal Relationship Tested					
	(1) Activists → Congress	(2) Congress → Activists	(3) Activists → Electorate	(4) Electorate → Activists	(5) Congress → Electorate	(6) Electorate → Congress
<i>Granger Causality Models</i> (Dependent Variable = Y)						
Congress _{t-1}	-.01 (.97)	-.10 (.47)	-----	-----	1.02* (.22)	1.26* (.22)
Activists _{t-1}	1.09* (.29)	1.10* (.46)	.83* (.25)	1.17* (.15)	-----	-----
Electorate _{t-1}	-----	-----	-.41 (.39)	-.28 (.23)	-.67 (.34)	-.28 (.33)
Constant	-3.45 (2.54)	5.48 (4.08)	-26.90* (9.68)	.09 (5.74)	-27.51* (7.24)	-2.16 (7.03)
(N=8)						
AIC	34.97	42.56	48.96	40.61	45.22	44.74
BIC	35.21	42.80	49.20	40.84	45.46	44.98
<i>Error Correction Models</i> (Dependent Variable = Y)						
Congress _{t-1}	-.99* (.32)	-.32 (.98)	-----	-----	1.06* (.28)	.42 (.54)
Activists _{t-1}	1.07* (.31)	.68 (.98)	.87* (.31)	.23 (.29)	-----	-----
Electorate _{t-1}	-----	-----	-1.47* (.50)	-1.72* (.41)	-1.72 (.41)	-.56 (.88)
Activist Change in Polarization	.15 (.30)	-----	-.21 (.84)	-----	-----	-----
Congress Change in Polarization	-----	.39 (.78)	-----	-----	-.17 (.51)	-----
Electorate Change in Polarization	-----	-----	-----	-.07 (.29)	-----	-.16 (.48)
F-Test on X _{t-1} and X (df = 2, 4)	6.22*	0.15	4.53*	0.62	8.57*	0.35
(N=8)						
AIC	36.49	44.07	50.84	42.48	46.99	46.51
BIC	36.81	44.39	51.16	42.80	47.30	46.83
* p < .10 (two-tailed)						

Appendix E: Parameter Estimates from Structural Equation Models

Table E1 presents the estimates of the measurement model parameters for the analysis in Table 3.

Table E2 presents the measurement parameters for the analysis in Table 4. Table E3 presents the estimates of the measurement and structural parameters for the analysis in Table 5.

Table E1: Estimates of the Measurement Parameters in the Model of Partisan Issue Conversion (Table 3)

Latent Variable → Observed Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
1992		
Racial → Government Help for Blacks	1.000	-----
Racial → Spending on Programs for Blacks	1.121	0.072
Social Welfare → Government Services/Spending	1.000	-----
Social Welfare → Government Health Insurance	1.146	0.044
Social Welfare → Spending on Child Care	1.085	0.046
Social Welfare → Spending on Welfare	0.875	0.045
Social Welfare → Spending to Help Unemployed	1.012	0.046
Social Welfare → Spending on Public Schools	1.084	0.047
Abortion → Legality of Abortion	1.000	-----
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Life Groups	0.960	0.040
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Choice Groups	-1.056	0.040
2000		
Racial → Government Help for Blacks	1.000	-----
Racial → Spending on Programs for Blacks	1.361	0.097
Social Welfare → Government Services/Spending	1.000	-----
Social Welfare → Government Health Insurance	1.174	0.069
Social Welfare → Spending on Child Care	0.959	0.068
Social Welfare → Spending on Welfare	1.122	0.074
Social Welfare → Spending to Help Unemployed	0.805	0.066
Social Welfare → Spending on Public Schools	0.869	0.068
Abortion → Legality of Abortion	1.000	-----
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Life Groups	0.874	0.041
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Choice Groups	-0.974	0.041

Source: 1992-2000 Convention Delegate Study Panel

Table E2: Estimates of the Measurement Parameters in the Models of the Impact of Party Commitment (Table 4)

Latent Variable → Observed Variable	Republicans		Democrats	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
1992				
Racial → Government Help for Blacks	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Racial → Spending on Programs for Blacks	1.565	0.281	1.190	0.135
Social Welfare → Government Services/Spending	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Social Welfare → Government Health Insurance	1.145	0.240	0.672	0.088
Social Welfare → Spending on Child Care	2.599	0.402	1.077	0.118
Social Welfare → Spending on Welfare	0.774	0.169	1.335	0.142
Social Welfare → Spending to Help Unemployed	1.684	0.308	1.181	0.127
Social Welfare → Spending on Public Schools	2.385	0.393	0.860	0.102
Abortion → Legality of Abortion	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Life Groups	1.014	0.075	1.027	0.084
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Choice Groups	-0.913	0.073	-1.158	0.086
Party Commitment → Strength of Party Support	0.771	0.156	1.355	0.197
Party Commitment → Party Commitment in Campaign Work	1.172	0.221	2.234	0.307
Party Commitment → Difference in Party Thermometers	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Party Commitment → Represent Party Org. at Convention	1.320	0.349	2.057	0.340
Party Commitment → Hold Party Office	0.881	0.315	2.413	0.376
2000				
Racial → Government Help for Blacks	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Racial → Spending on Programs for Blacks	1.905	0.334	1.464	0.139
Social Welfare → Government Services/Spending	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Social Welfare → Government Health Insurance	0.878	0.182	0.914	0.129
Social Welfare → Spending on Child Care	2.471	0.323	0.676	0.096
Social Welfare → Spending on Welfare	1.775	0.244	1.852	0.194
Social Welfare → Spending to Help Unemployed	2.051	0.289	0.819	0.114
Social Welfare → Spending on Public Schools	2.226	0.315	0.594	0.098
Abortion → Legality of Abortion	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Life Groups	0.090	0.070	1.028	0.102
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Choice Groups	-0.821	0.065	-1.192	0.110
Party Commitment → Strength of Party Support	1.524	0.340	1.305	0.192
Party Commitment → Party Commitment in Campaign Work	2.495	0.582	2.708	0.386
Party Commitment → Difference in Party Thermometers	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Party Commitment → Represent Party Org. at Convention	1.773	0.583	1.420	0.328
Party Commitment → Hold Party Office	2.431	0.697	2.342	0.438

Source: 1992-2000 Convention Delegate Study Panel

Table E3: Estimates of the Structural and Measurement Parameters in the Models of Partisan Conversion for Low and High Party Commitment Groups (Table 5)

	Low Party Commitment		High Party Commitment	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Structural Parameters				
1992 Social Welfare → 2000 Social Welfare	0.536	0.041	0.524	0.036
1992 Racial → 2000 Racial	0.648	0.061	0.678	0.059
1992 Abortion → 2000 Abortion	0.915	0.040	0.828	0.044
1992 Ideology → 2000 Ideology	0.719	0.036	0.489	0.032
1992 Ideology → 2000 Social Welfare	0.229	0.030	0.130	0.026
1992 Ideology → 2000 Racial	0.066	0.038	0.031	0.037
1992 Ideology → 2000 Abortion	0.152	0.031	0.135	0.032
1992 Party → 2000 Social Welfare	0.142	0.017	0.217	0.017
1992 Party → 2000 Racial	0.061	0.021	0.111	0.024
1992 Party → 2000 Abortion	0.009	0.017	0.086	0.018
1992 Party → 2000 Ideology	0.102	0.020	0.258	0.019
Measurement Parameters				
1992				
Racial → Government Help for Blacks	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Racial → Spending on Programs for Blacks	1.223	0.201	1.189	0.172
Social Welfare → Government Services/Spending	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Social Welfare → Government Health Insurance	1.146	0.067	1.194	0.064
Social Welfare → Spending on Child Care	1.185	0.074	1.025	0.066
Social Welfare → Spending on Welfare	0.935	0.071	0.830	0.064
Social Welfare → Spending to Help Unemployed	1.077	0.072	0.970	0.064
Social Welfare → Spending on Public Schools	1.152	0.074	1.065	0.067
Abortion → Legality of Abortion	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Life Groups	0.963	0.058	0.978	0.062
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Choice Groups	-1.034	0.057	-1.067	0.062
2000				
Racial → Government Help for Blacks	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Racial → Spending on Programs for Blacks	1.515	0.255	1.404	0.219
Social Welfare → Government Services/Spending	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Social Welfare → Government Health Insurance	1.127	0.090	1.255	0.091
Social Welfare → Spending on Child Care	0.920	0.092	0.960	0.088
Social Welfare → Spending on Welfare	1.113	0.100	1.079	0.094
Social Welfare → Spending to Help Unemployed	0.816	0.090	0.766	0.084
Social Welfare → Spending on Public Schools	0.911	0.093	0.845	0.087
Abortion → Legality of Abortion	1.000	-----	1.000	-----
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Life Groups	0.868	0.057	0.861	0.065
Abortion → Thermometer of Pro-Choice Groups	-0.964	0.056	-0.926	0.064

Source: 1992-2000 Convention Delegate Study Panel

Appendix F: Description of the Indicators of Party Commitment

Strength of party support: Respondents were asked to “Please choose the number that best describes how strongly you support your political party” and were provided with a seven-point scale ranging from “not very strong” to “very strong.” Over 82 percent of panel respondents rated themselves at 6 or 7 on the scale, with nearly 54 percent (57% of Republicans and 52% of Democrats) choosing the highest value.


Importance of party commitment for presidential campaign activity: Whether “none,” “some,” or “a lot” of 1992/2000 presidential campaign was motivated by being “committed to party work.” Over 70 percent (75% of Republicans and 68% of Democrats) chose “a lot.”

Difference in Thermometer Ratings of Parties: The difference between respondents’ ratings of their own party on a feeling thermometer (ranging from 0 to 100) and their ratings of the other party. Higher scores indicate more-positive feelings toward the GOP and more-negative feelings toward the Democratic party for Republican respondents and just the opposite for Democratic respondents. The mean rating of the Republican party in 1992 was 26.7 for Democratic panel respondents and 86.8 for Republican respondents. The mean rating of the Democratic party was 27.9 for Republicans and 86.3 for Democrats.

Representation of the party organization at the national convention: Respondents were asked “Which of the groups listed below comes closest to describing the ones you represented at the 1992 (2000) convention?” In 2000, they were provided with six groups—party organization, candidate support group, geographic place, demographic group, organized group, and “other”—and asked to rank them from one to six. In 1992, they were provided with four groups—party organization, candidate support group, partisan voters, and “other,” and asked to rank the top three. Our indicator is a dummy variable for respondents who ranked the party organization first. In 1992, 54% of Republicans and 32% of Democrats ranked the party organization first. In 2000 (with more choices to rank), 27% of Republicans and 18% of Democrats ranked the party organization first.

Holding party office: A dummy variable for respondents who held local, state, or national party office in 1992/2000. In 1992, 66% of Republicans and 58% of Democrats held party office. In 2000, that was true of 49% of Republican respondents and 42% of Democratic respondents.


Figure 1: Polarization Between Republican and Democratic Activists on Three Policy Dimensions, 1972-2004



Source: 1972-2004 Delegate Studies

Note: Party differences are the estimated differences in Republican and Democratic means on latent variables (ranging from 0 for the most liberal position to 1 for the most conservative position) from confirmatory factor analyses of policy attitudes.


Figure 2: Combination of Social Welfare, Racial, and Cultural Issue Positions among Democratic and Republican Activists, 1972-2004




Source: 1972-2004 Convention Delegate Studies

Figure 3: Issue Polarization among Party Activists, the Parties in Congress, and the Parties in the Electorate, 1972-2004


Social Welfare Issues




Racial Issues



Cultural Issues



Abortion



Source: 1972-2004 Convention Delegate Studies, National Election Studies, and Congressional Roll-Call Votes

Note: The levels of party polarization on social welfare issues, racial issues, and cultural issues have been standardized to have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 25. For abortion, party polarization is the pro-life percentage among Republicans minus the pro-life percentage among Democrats.

Table 1: Party Polarization among Presidential Campaign Activists in 1992 and 2000: Overall Change, Replacement Effects, and Conversion Effects

Group and Type of Change	Level of Party Polarization ^a			(N)
	Abortion	Social Welfare	Racial Issues	
<i>Overall Change</i>				
All activists in 1992	.37	.43	.38	(2791)
All activists in 2000	.43	.49	.45	(2993)
<i>Change from Activist Replacement</i>				
Drop-outs in 1992	.37	.36	.36	(150)
Newcomers in 2000	.47	.47	.48	(140)
<i>Change from Issue Conversion</i>				
Stayers in 1992	.36	.44	.33	(722)
Stayers in 2000	.41	.48	.39	(722)
<i>Percentage of Overall Change Due to:^b</i>				
Replacement	29.4%	31.5%	29.1%	
Conversion	70.6%	68.5%	70.9%	

Source: 1992 and 2000 Convention Delegate Studies

Note: “Drop-outs” are 1992 activists (in the panel study) who were not active in the 2000 presidential campaign. “Newcomers” are 2000 activists (in the 2000 cross-section) who became active after 1992. “Stayers” are individuals (in the panel study) who were active in both the 1992 and 2000 presidential campaigns.

^a Entries are coefficients on a party dummy (coded 0 for Democrats and 1 for Republicans) affecting the confirmatory abortion, racial, and social welfare factors (all ranging from -1 for most liberal to 1 for most conservative) in structural equation models. The effect of the party dummy on all three latent variables is significant at $p < .001$ in each year.

^b Replacement’s contribution to the increase in party polarization is the proportion of 1992 activists dropping out of party activity by 2000 (.17) multiplied by the difference in the polarization level between newcomers in 2000 and drop-outs in 1992. Conversion’s contribution to the increase in party polarization is the proportion of 1992 activists remaining active in 2000 (.83) multiplied by the difference in the polarization level between stayers in 2000 and stayers in 1992 (Rapoport and Stone 1994). These contributions were divided by the overall change to compute the percentage contributions.

Table 2: Attitude Constraint among Presidential Campaign Activists in 1992 and 2000: Overall Change, Replacement Effects, and Conversion Effects in Correlations between Issue Attitudes

Group and Pair of Issues	Overall Change		Replacement Effects		Conversion Effects	
	All Activists in 1992	All Activists in 2000	Drop-Outs in 1992	Newcomers in 2000	Stayers in 1992	Stayers in 2000
Both Parties' Activists						
Abortion–Social Welfare	.67	.76	.56	.79	.69	.75
Abortion–Racial	.54	.61	.43	.59	.55	.60
Social Welfare–Racial	.86	.87	.85	.86	.86	.87
(N)	(2791)	(2993)	(150)	(140)	(722)	(722)
Democratic Activists						
Abortion–Social Welfare	.32	.36	.14*	.28	.38	.40
Abortion–Racial	.24	.29	.07*	.15*	.31	.36
Social Welfare–Racial	.75	.74	.69	.63	.76	.76
(N)	(1829)	(1963)	(108)	(96)	(459)	(459)
Republican Activists						
Abortion–Social Welfare	.35	.54	.27*	.71	.29	.47
Abortion–Racial	.18	.32	---	---	.13*	.29
Social Welfare–Racial	.74	.83	---	---	.83	.81
(N)	(962)	(1030)	(42)	(44)	(263)	(263)

Source: 1992 and 2000 Convention Delegate Studies

Note: Entries are correlations between latent abortion attitude, latent social welfare attitude, and latent racial attitude. See table 1 for explanation of drop-outs, newcomers, and stayers.

* $p > .05$. All other correlations and effects of the party dummy are significant at $p < .05$.

Table 3: Partisan Conversion? The Effects of Party, Ideology, and Attitudes on Other Issues on Issue Attitude Change among Continuing Activists from 1992 to 2000

Exogenous Variables	Endogenous Variables			
	2000 Social Welfare	2000 Racial	2000 Abortion	2000 Ideological I.D
1992 Social Welfare	.39*** (.02)	.16*** (.03)	-.05 (.03)	.16*** (.02)
1992 Racial	.29*** (.03)	.71*** (.04)	.10*** (.03)	.14*** (.03)
1992 Abortion	.10*** (.02)	.04* (.02)	.89*** (.03)	.18*** (.02)
1992 Ideological Identification	.06*** (.02)	-.01 (.02)	.10*** (.02)	.38*** (.02)
<i>Party Affiliation (1=Republican)</i>	.17*** (.01)	.03* (.01)	.05*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)
(N)	(722)			
χ^2 (df)	3497.19 (258)			
Δ_1/Δ_2^a	.89/.89			
ρ_1/ρ_2^b	.86/.87			

Source: 1992-2000 Convention Delegate Study Panel

Note: Entries are unstandardized full information maximum likelihood coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Issue attitudes and ideological identification range from most liberal to most conservative. All variables range from 0 to 1.

^a Bentler and Bonett's (1980) normed fit index/Bollen's (1989) incremental fit index

^b Bollen's (1986) relative fit index/Bentler and Bonett's (1980) non-normed fit index

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05 (one-tailed tests)

Table 4: The Impact of Party Commitment on Attitude Change among Continuing Activists from 1992 to 2000

Exogenous Variables	Endogenous Variable				
	2000 Social Welfare	2000 Racial	2000 Abortion	2000 Ideology	2000 Party Commitment
Republicans					
<i>Stability Coefficient</i> (Effect of Variable's 1992 Value on its 2000 Value)	.82*** (.13)	.83*** (.13)	.98*** (.06)	.50*** (.05)	.52*** (.09)
<i>Effects of 1992 Issue Attitudes and Ideology</i>					
1992 Social Welfare	—	.55*** (.15)	.06 (.14)	.45*** (.11)	.06 (.06)
1992 Racial	.27*** (.05)	—	.10 (.08)	.001 (.06)	-.05 (.04)
1992 Abortion	.11*** (.02)	.07* (.03)	—	.22*** (.03)	.03* (.02)
1992 Ideology	.02 (.03)	-.07 (.05)	.12* (.06)	—	.01 (.03)
<i>Effect of 1992 Party Commitment</i>	.10** (.05)	.14** (.08)	.13* (.10)	.30*** (.09)	—
(N)	(263)				
χ^2 (df)	1063.08 (488)				
Δ_1/Δ_2^b	.95/.97				
ρ_1/ρ_2^c	.94/.96				
Democrats					
<i>Stability Coefficient</i> (Effect of Variable's 1992 Value on its 2000 Value)	.28*** (.05)	.95*** (.09)	.80*** (.05)	.34*** (.04)	.47*** (.07)
<i>Effects of 1992 Issue Attitudes and Ideology</i>					
1992 Social Welfare	—	.08 (.06)	-.08** (.05)	.13** (.06)	.03 (.03)
1992 Racial	.44*** (.06)	—	.20*** (.04)	.33*** (.06)	-.07** (.03)
1992 Abortion	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.05)	—	.11** (.05)	-.03 (.03)
1992 Ideology	.06** (.03)	.002 (.04)	.08** (.03)	—	.004 (.02)
<i>Effect of 1992 Party Commitment</i>	-.07* (.05)	-.19** (.10)	.05 (.07)	-.03 (.10)	—
(N)	(459)				
χ^2 (df)	1390.04 (488)				
Δ_1/Δ_2^a	.94/.96				
ρ_1/ρ_2^b	.96/.96				

Source: 1992-2000 Convention Delegate Study Panel

Note: Entries are unstandardized full information maximum likelihood coefficients from a single model for each party. Standard errors are in parentheses. Issue attitudes and ideological identification range from most liberal to most conservative. All variables range from 0 to 1.

^a Bentler and Bonett's (1980) normed fit index/Bollen's (1989) incremental fit index

^b Bollen's (1986) relative fit index/Bentler and Bonett's (1980) non-normed fit index

***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (one-tailed tests)

Table 5: The Effect of Party on Attitude Change by Level of Party Commitment in 1992 — Continuing Activists, 1992 to 2000

Endogenous Variable	Effect of Party Dummy	
	Low Party Commitment	High Party Commitment
2000 Abortion Attitude	.01 (.02)	.09** (.01)
2000 Social Welfare Attitude	.14** (.02)	.22** (.01)
2000 Racial Attitude	.06* (.03)	.11** (.02)
2000 Ideology	.10** (.02)	.26** (.01)
(N)	(323)	(303)

Source: 1992-2000 Convention Delegate Study Panel

Note: Entries are the effect of party (coded 0 for Democrats and 1 for Republicans) on change in abortion attitude, social welfare attitude, racial attitude, and ideology between 1992 and 2000 in models in which the 2000 values of these variables are functions of their own past values, party affiliation, and 1992 ideology. Standard errors are in parentheses.

**p<.001; *p<.05.

Table 6: Party Polarization among Presidential Campaign Activists in 1992 and 2000 by Level of Party Commitment

	Level of Party Polarization ^a			(N)
	Abortion	Social Welfare	Racial Issues	
<i>Low Party Commitment</i>				
1992	.35	.40	.36	(1069)
2000	.39	.42	.40	(1081)
<i>High Party Commitment</i>				
1992	.37	.48	.41	(1046)
2000	.50	.57	.54	(1097)

Source: 1992 and 2000 Convention Delegate Studies

^a Entries are coefficients on a party dummy (coded 0 for Democrats and 1 for Republicans) affecting the confirmatory abortion, racial, and social welfare factors (all ranging from -1 for most liberal to 1 for most conservative) in structural equation models. The effect of the party dummy on all three latent variables is significant at $p < .001$ for both groups in each year.

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